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Case Notes

Antitrust-Clayton Act-Conglomerate Merger-Preliminary Injunction-UnitedStates v. Wilson SportingGoods Co., 288 F. Supp.
543 (N.D. Ill. 1968).
Wilson Sporting Goods Company, the major competitor in the broad-line sports
equipment field and a subsidiary of the Ling-Temco-Vought conglomerate, sought to
acquire through merger the Nissen Corporation, the premier competitor in the highly
concentrated gymnastic equipment market. The government contended that the acquisition, a conglomerate merger, would substantially lessen competition in violation of
Section 7 of the Clayton Act.1 To remedy this alleged antitrust violation the Justice
Department moved for a preliminary injunction pending trial on the merits, as provided for in Section 15 of the Clayton Act. 2
Defendants maintained that in order for the court to grant the motion for preliminary injunction the government must establish both that it will probably prevail
at trial on the merits and that there is a particular need for preliminary injunctive
relief. Plaintiff asserted that the law on the question indicated that only the former
need be established; that is, the demonstration of a probability of a violation of
Section 7 is sufficient grounds for the court to enjoin the merger. The court agreed
with the government's position. 3
The significance of the Wilson case lies in the fact that the district court granted
the government's request for preliminary injunction, thereby becoming the first court
ever to grant such a remedy in a conglomerate merger case. Such an interlocutory
decree is not appealable. 4 Final disposition of the case was accomplished when defendants, faced with the fact that the merger was effectively scuttled by the injunction, accepted a consent judgment which required the abandonment of the WilsonNissen merger and stipulated that Wilson was not to attempt another entry by merger
into the gymnastic equipment field for the next five years without first providing
sixty days notice to the Justice Department. 5
Section Seven-Probabilityof Violation
Section 7 of the Clayton Act, as amended in 1950, states: "no corporation .. shall
acquire the whole or any part of the assets of another corporation .. . where in any
1. 64 Stat. 1125 (1950), 15 U.S.C. § 18 (1964), formerly 38 Stat. 731 (1914).
2. 38 Stat. 736 (1914), 15 U.S.C. § 25 (1964).
3. United States v. Wilson Sporting Goods Co., 288 F. Supp. 543, 570 (N.D. Ill.
1968). See United States v. Chrysler Corp., 232 F. Supp. 651 (D.N.J. 1964); United
States v. Crocker-Anglo Nat'l Bank, 223 F. Supp. 849 (N.D. Cal. 1963).
4. The question of appealability of preliminary injunctions will be discussed later in
this note.
5. 1968 Trade Cas. 72,585 (N.D. Il.).

Catholic University Law Review

[Vol. xvII

line of commerce in any section of the country, the effect of such acquisition may be
substantially to lessen competition .... -6 Since this section makes broad competitive
effects the standard for judging a merger, it includes within its purview corporate
acquisitions which are attempts at diversification as well as traditional horizontal and
7
vertical mergers.
In the instant case the district court described the proposed marriage of Wilson
and Nissen as a "product-extension" merger,8 with the gymnastic equipment market
the relative line of commerce. 9 Weighing the market shares of each merger participant
in his respective industry, the court concluded that each was the premier competitor
in highly oligopolistic industries. Although Professor Turner suggests that weighing
relative market shares of merging companies is an insignificant factor in evaluating
conglomerate mergers, 10 realistically it is necessary in determining market power and,
hence, in evaluating possible effects on competition.
The government's principal contentions were that the proposed merger would raise
entry barriers in the gymnastic equipment market, eliminate Wilson as a potential
entrant, discourage vigorous competition by smaller competitors, and entrench Wilson
in the sporting goods industry. Defendants denied that entry barriers would be raised
by the proposed merger and pointed to the fact that Nissen's share in the market had
been steadily decreasing over a period of seven years.11
While agreeing that the instant case presented a somewhat different problem of
analysis than the cases relied upon by the government,' 2 the court disagreed with defendants' position that FTC v. Proctor & Gamble Co. 13 and General Foods Corp. v.
FTC14 were to be viewed as holding for the proposition that huge advertising advantages were essential to demonstrating anticompetitive effects in a conglomerate
merger. The Supreme Court in Proctor & Gamble15 upheld the banning of the
acquisition of the Clorox Company, the premier competitor in the highly oligopolistic

6. 64 Stat. 1125 (1950), 15 U.S.C. § 18 (1964), formerly 38 Stat. 731 (1914).
7. Any merger which cannot be classified as horizontal or vertical falls into the conglomerate category. See Turner, Conglomerate Mergers and Section 7 of the Clayton
Act, 78 HARV. L. REV. 1313 (1965).
8. United States v. Wilson Sporting Goods Co., supra note 3, at 548. A "product
extension" merger is one in which the parties to the merger manufacture different products
which are, however, related and in which integration in marketing or distribution may
be generated. See FTC v. Proctor & Gamble Co., 386 U.S. 568 (1967) ; General Foods
Corp. v. FTC, 386 F.2d 936 (3d Cir. 1967).
9. Defining the relevant line of commerce was a problem in early diversification merger
cases. See United States v. Ling-Temco Electronics, Inc., 1961 Trade Cas. f 70,160
(N.D. Tex.), in which the court held that since the aerospace industry was not a discernible "line of commerce" under Section 7 the conglomerate merger was not an antitrust violation.
10. Turner, supra note 7, at 1316. However, in postulating guidelines for adjudicating
antitrust action involving conglomerate mergers, Professor Turner appears to emphasize
market positions of the firms as providing a standard of evaluation. Id. at 1369.
11. Brief for Defendants at 17, United States v. Wilson Sporting Goods Co., supra
note 3.
12. United States v. Wilson Sporting Goods Co., supra note 3, at 551.
13. 386 U.S. 568 (1967).
14. 386 F.2d 936 (3d Cir. 1967).
15. FTC v. Proctor & Gamble Co., supra note 13.
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liquid bleach market, by Proctor and Gamble, the largest manufacturer of a broad
line of household cleaning products. Consideration of the role played by mass media
advertising in the bleach industry was given utmost weight by the Court. However,
the grounds cited by the Court for proscribing the merger were that the acquisition
of Clorox would dissuade small firms from competing aggressively in the liquid
bleach market, 16 raise barriers prohibitive to new entrants,17 and remove Proctor
as the most likely entrant into the liquid bleach field.13
In Wilson, it was clear that advertising played no significhit role in the gymnastic
equipment market. 19 However, the grounds asserted by the government were otherwise
substantially the same as those held to be anticompetitive in the earlier case. In
General Foods20 the Third Circuit upheld an order divesting General Foods of the
SOS Company on the grounds that, as in Proctor & Gamble, the merger involved
markets featuring "high-consumer-oriented advertising budgets; the same distributional outlets, primarily grocery stores and supermarkets; and the same ultimate consumer group, the housewife. ' 21 Unlike Proctor and Gamble and Wilson, General Foods
was not found to be a potential entrant into the acquired's market, but the court of
appeals in General Foods did not read Proctor& Gamble as establishing that the potential entry position of the acquirer is an essential element in striking down as anticompetitive a product-extension merger. Similarly, the court in Wilson dismissed the
impact of the advertising test, which was determinative in Proctor & Gamble and
General Foods, as not being a per se requirement established by the earlier two
cases. The significant common factor in all three of the product-extension merger
cases was that each could enable considerable integration in the "production, distribution, or marketing activities of the merging firms." 22 (Emphasis added.)
The court stressed the facts that both Wilson and Nissen used many of the same
dealers to merchandise their products, and that they both employed sales teams to visit
coaches' clinics and institutions who were potential buyers. Although admittedly
finding little evidence to support the contention that smaller firms would be less
likely to compete aggressively in the gymnastic industry, the factor of small potential
entrants being hesitant was held to be a decisive consideration toward proving
23
anticompetitive effects.
In examining the relevant markets, the district court pointed to the potential reciprocal purchasing possibilities inherent in the merger, since most sporting goods
dealers, the major marketing outlet for gymnastic equipment in the country, rely
heavily on Wilson for their broad-line sporting goods features. Whether Wilson would
engage in reciprocal purchasing arrangements did not have to be proven, the court
said, citing United States v. Ingersoll-Rand Co. 24 for the proposition that the mere
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.

Id. at 578.
Id. at 579.
Id. at 580-81.
United States v. Wilson Sporting Goods Co., supra note 3, at 552.
General Foods Corp. v. FTC, supra note 14.
Id. at 944.
General Foods Corp. v. FTC, supra note 14, at 944.
United States v. Wilson Sporting Goods Co., supra note 3, at 557-58.
218 F. Supp. 530 (W.D. Pa.), af/'d, 320 F.2d 509 (3d Cir. 1963).
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existence of such power may be sufficient to have ,long-run anticompetitive effects
on the market in violation of Section 7 of the Clayton Act.25 This possibility of
reciprocal arrangements and effects is always present in product-extension mergers
when the parties' distributional outlets are identical.
Although the court found no evidence that Wilson would have entered the gymnastic equipment market by internal expansion, it nevertheless considered the removal
of Wilson from the fringe of the market a significant anticompetitive effect. 26 A
company does not necessarily have to consider itself a likely entrant; it is sufficient
that the competitors within the market believe the company is a potential entrant
and that there be no insurmountable barriers to such an entry. Thus a firm on the
fringe of the market may exert substantial procompetitive influence on the market
merely by its fringe position. 27 Its elimination from such position may, therefore, be
28
seen as an anticompetitive development.
Wilson's entrenchment in the sporting goods industry was held to be another probable result of the merger which would offend competition. 29 Furthermore, the merger
would eliminate competition between Wilson and Nissen in the limited areas where
it.
already existed and would thwart any possible future competition between the two
companies, 3 0 In the final analysis, however, the decision on the merits is based to a
large degree on the court's acceptance of the government's contention that "economic
power is economic power" 3 1 whether it be in the form of advertising discounts, possible
reciprocity advantages, or in raising entry barriers to a market. The conglomerate
merger field is not cluttered with per se rules. Wilson being the largest sporting goods
company and Nissen being the largest competitor in a related and oligopolistic market,
the court found anticompetitive probabilities sufficient to rule in favor of the government.

The Remedy--Preliminary Injunction
In opposition to the preliminary injunction sought by the government, defendants
argued that such an order before a full trial on the merits could be had would amount
to a total victory for the government. Defendants proposed that the court subject the
merger to a "hold still" order which would make divestiture easy to accomplish should
the plaintiff prevail at trial on the merits. The government did not address itself to the

25. United States v. Wilson Sporting Goods Co., supra note 3, at 555.
26. Id. at 560-62.
27. Id. at 563. See discussion in Turner, supra note 7, at 1363.
28. See also Ekco Prod. Co. v. FTC, 347 F.2d 745 (7th Cir. 1965) (large manufacturer of baking pans divested of company with a metal meat box monopoly on the
grounds that the acquisition would entrench the acquired's monopoly and would eliminate
acquirer as most likely potential entrant by means of internal expansion) ; United States
v. Penn-Olin Chem. Co., 378 U.S. 158 (1964) (joint venture barred on the grounds that
the parties were the most likely entrants into market and that internal expansion is
preferable to acquisition).
29. United States v. Wilson Sporting Goods Co., supra note 3, at 563.
30. Id. at 564.
31. Plaintiff's oral argument, United States v. Wilson Sporting Goods Co., supra
note 3.
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question of the propriety of the preliminary injunction in its brief. Its position was that
a demonstration of the probability of winning on the merits is the sole requirement
for granting the injunction. Preliminary injunction, the government argued, is one of
the ordinary remedies available by statute to deal with probable Clayton Act violations.
Each of the three cases 32 in which the government has successfully obtained a preliminary injunction has involved a horizontal merger. Defendants maintained that this
fact was significant since these mergers have been subject to clearly established per se
rules, promulgated by higher court decisions, for determining anticompetitive effects. This argument accepted that these three preliminary injunctions were therefore appropriate since, on the merits, these were "easy" cases. The defense maintained that the instant case did not benefit from such clearly defined law since the
area of product-extension conglomerate mergers has not seen as much litigation as
has the area of horizontal mergers. Therefore, the defense urged that such nonappealable injunctive relief should not be granted in the case at bar since the necessary
decision on the merits, coming in an unsettled area of law, should be subject to
appellate scrutiny.
In United States v. FMC Corp.,33 the first conglomerate merger case in which a
preliminary injunction was requested, the district court denied the motion on the
ground that the balance of equities was in favor of defendants. Concluding that the
defendants would suffer great damage without recourse to any remedy, the court
accepted as the basic proposition that "divestiture is a complete and adequate
remedy."34 Defendant urged the court to accept this statement as governing in the
instant case. However, the court in FMC Corporation also felt that the government
had failed to demonstrate any clear probability of winning on the merits. 35 Thus,
the case failed to meet the standard submitted by the government in Wilson, namely,
that the criterion for granting a preliminary injunction is that the government demonstrate a probability of winning on the merits.
The government need not demonstrate particular injury to seek equitable relief
under Section 15. In United States v. Brown Shoe Co.,3 6 the district court held that
the government meets its burden by showing a probable violation of law; injury to
the public may then be presumed. However, it has been the rule that the court may
also look to the probable injury to the defendants in weighing the advisability of
granting a motion for preliminary injunction under Section 15.37 This was done in
United States v. Aluminum Ltd.,38 resulting in the preliminary injunction being
32. United States v. Pennzoil Co., 252 F. Supp. 962 (W.D. Pa. 1965) ; United States
v. Chrysler Corp., supra note 3; United States v. Ingersoll-Rand Co., supra note 24.
33. 218 F. Supp. 817 (N.D. Cal.), appeal dismissed, 321 F.2d 534 (9th Cir.), appeal
dismissed, 84 S. Ct. 4 (1963) (Goldberg in chambers).
34. United States v. FMC Corp., supra note 33, 218 F. Supp. at 822.
35. Id. at 823.

36. 1956 Trade Cas. 1 68,244 (E.D. Mo.).
37. United States v. FMC Corp., supra note 33, 218 F. Supp. at 822. Section 16 of the
Clayton Act, 38 Stat. 737 (1914), 15 U.S.C. § 26 (1964), allows private parties to sue
for injunctive relief in antitrust cases. However, such suits are subject to the ordinary
balancing of harms under equity. See Hamilton Watch Co. v. Benrus Watch Co., 206
F.2d 738 (2d Cir. 1953).
38. 1965 Trade Cas. 71,366 (D.N.J.).
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denied. The merger was permitted to be consummated subject to a "hold still" order.
39
Similar results have been reached in other cases.
The standard for granting a preliminary injunction was defined by the Third
Circuit as based upon the showing of "probability of a lessening of competition and
a showing of a reasonable probability of success on final hearing. ' 40 The propriety
of granting such a motion rests in the "sound discretion of the trial court." 41 Reasoning
that the harm to the merger participants was outweighed by the probable adverse
effects upon commerce, the court in Wilson made what it considered to be a "bold
step" and granted the injunction. 42 The court accepted the government's contention
that divestiture would be hard to effect if the Wilson-Nissen merger were allowed to
be consummated, due to the fact that Nissen's president, George Nissen, was the
principal factor in accounting for Nissen's preeminent position in gymnastic equipment, and that particular asset of Nissen Corporation would be impossible to divest
by court order.
PreliminaryInjunction Order Not Appealable
In Ingersoll-Rand43 the Third Circuit reviewed a district court's issuance of a preliminary injunction and affirmed that decision. The Ninth Circuit, however, in FMC
Corporation44 refused to take jurisdiction in an appeal from a district court's refusal
to grant a preliminary injunction on the ground that an appeal to a court of appeals
from a grant or denial of a preliminary injunction in an antitrust case in which the
United States is a party is precluded by Section 2 of the Expediting Act of 1903. 4 5
The divergence between circuits was resolved in favor of the Ninth Circuit in Mr.
Justice Goldberg's opinion, holding that the Expediting Act precludes an appeal either
to a court of appeals or to the Supreme Court from an interlocutory order in an anti46
trust case tried before a single district judge.
The Ingersoll-Rand case was the only case ever to hold that appeals could be taken
to courts of appeal from district court preliminary injunction decrees under Section

39. See United States v. First Nat'l Bank, 257 F. Supp. 591 (D. Hawaii 1966);
United States v. Brown Shoe Co., supra note 36. But see United States v. Amfac, Civil No.
2576 (D. Hawaii 1966), where the court restrained a merger on the grounds that there
was a probability of eliminating a potential competitor and a danger of reciprocity.
40. United States v. Ingersoll-Rand Co., supra note 24, 320 F.2d at 525.
41. Id. at 523.
42. United States v. Wilson Sporting Goods Co., supra note 3, at 570.
43. United States v. Ingersoll-Rand Co., supra note 24.
44. United States v. FMC Corp., supra note 33.
45. "In every civil action brought in any district court of the United States under any
of said Acts, wherein the United States is complainant, an appeal from the final judgment of the district court will lie only to the Supreme Court." 32 Stat. 823 (1903),
as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 29 (1964).
46. United States v. FMC Corp., supra note 33, 84 S. Ct. at 4 (1963) (Goldberg in
chambers). Mr. Justice Goldberg did not consider the question of whether an appeal
could be had to the Supreme Court from an interlocutory order of a three-judge court
convened at the government's request pursuant to Section 1 of the Expediting Act, 32
Stat. 823 (1903), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 28 (1964). See United States v. FMC Corp.,
supra at 7 nn.10, 11.
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15. The attempted appeal in FMC Corporation was based on the contention that
Section 1292(a) of the Judiciary Code47 made such an appeal possible. This argument was not accepted in view of the fact that Congress, in the Expediting Act,
specifically intended to remove Clayton Act cases in which the government was the
complainant from review in the courts of appeals. Additionally, since a preliminary
injunction is not a final judgment under the Expediting Act, the Supreme Court will
not hear an appeal from its grant or denial. 48 Therefore, there is no appeal from such
decisions according to ordinary procedures. 49 This situation was recognized by defendants in Wilson. Their counsel ascribed it as one of the main considerations for
defendants' abandonment of the merger plans and acceptance of the consent judgment. 50
One method that can be used to make a preliminary injunction decision appealable
was employed in United States v. Standard Oil of New ]ersey.51 In that conglomerate
merger case the parties agreed to accept the preliminary injunction as a permanent
injunction, and, with the consent of the court, the hearing on the injunction became
the trial on the merits.52 Thus, the decree entered was a final judgment and was
appealable to the Supreme Court under the Expediting Act. This technique has the
advantage of allowing an appeal, and it avoids a decree that could force the abandonment of a merger before a trial can be had on the merits.
Section 1292(b) of the Judicial Code 53 may provide an avenue for appeal to the
courts of appeals. However, such an appeal could be taken only when "a controlling
question of law" is involved and the district court so certifies to the court of appeals.
The fact that the government must clearly demonstrate the probabiliy of success on
the merits before a preliminary injunction is granted under Section 15 makes it unlikely that such an appeal under Section 1292(b) would arise. Such an appeal would
not be concerned with the propriety of the injunction as much as with the determination of probability of success on the merits. In such a close case the injunction would
probably be denied, and a trial would be required.
A decision on a preliminary injunction motion by a three-judge district court may
be appealable to the Supreme Court under Section 1253 of the Judiciary Code, which
provides that "[e]xcept as otherwise provided by law, any party may appeal . . . from
an order granting or denying . . . an interlocutory or permanent injunction . . .
heard and determined by a district court of three judges. '54 However, the applicability
of Section 1253 to cases arising under the Expediting Act is cast in doubt by the
exception: "as otherwise provided by law .

.

... "55 Furthermore, the Court's refusal

47. 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a) (1964).
48. United States v. FMC Corp., supra note 33, 84 S. Ct. at 7.
49. Ibid.
50. Interview with Mr. Howard Adler, attorney for defendant Wilson Sporting Goods
Co., in Washington, D.C., Oct. 29, 1968.
51. 253 F. Supp. 196 (D.N.J. 1966).
52. See FED. R. Crv. P. 65(a) (2).
53. 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b) (1964).
54. 28 U.S.C. § 1253 (1964).
55. See United States v. FMC Corp., supra note 33, 84 S.Ct. at 7 n.l1.
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to override the Expediting Act by use of Section 1292(a) of the Judiciary Code in
the case of single-judge courts makes it unlikely that this suggested use of the Judiciary
Code would succeed in overcoming the congressional intent to expedite antitrust
cases.
Conclusion
Preliminary injunctions have been infrequently granted by the courts in antitrust
cases. 56 The factor of lack of appealability, coupled with economic realities, can make
the use of preliminary injunctions a powerful weapon against mergers that would
offend competition. Several factors can be seen, however, that would point toward
more extensive use of the preliminary injunction procedure in future antitrust litigations. Divestiture is often difficult to effect after a merger has been accomplished.
Once assets have been mixed the courts must find a means of establishing a viable
corporation from the assets or approve a sale of the assets that does not itself decrease
competition. The preliminary injunction has the advantage of preventing the merger
from taking place when it is seen as an antitrust violation. Other incentives toward
future utilization of Section 15 include the probability of ever-increasing clarity in
guidelines and legal principles governing conglomerate mergers as more cases reach
the Supreme Court, and the hope of success generated by the outcome in Wilson.
Using the preliminary injunction device also serves to hasten an effective decision
in merger cases. The hearing on the injunction can bring out all the essential evidence
and testimony in a matter of days, since the court need hear only those parties whose
testimony it feels will serve the ends of justice. 57 Serving as a drawback to the frequent
use of the preliminary injunction is the fact that it may be granted at the discretion
of the court on a showing of probability of an antitrust violation rather than on actual
proof of such a violation at trial. In Wilson, defendants urged that should the court
grant the injunction, the merger would, in effect, be barred. Economic realities make
a delay of several months in completing a merger the deathknell for a planned
acquisition. To date no merger has ever survived a preliminary injunction.
The fact that appeal from a grant or denial of a preliminary injunction is effectively
precluded has to date been of no particular advantage to either the government or
defendants. Most of the cases involving preliminary injunction motions have been
decided against the government. 58 Should the Expediting Act be repealed, the government would still be able to stall a merger by obtaining a continuance of a temporary
restraining order pending appeal to a court of appeals. Thus, a merger which required hasty consummation because of economic considerations could be delayed for
a crucial amount of time by the government's appealing an unfavorable disposition

56. United States v. Wilson Sporting Goods Co., supra note 3, at 568.
57. See 38 Stat. 736 (1914), 15 U.S.C. § 25 (1964). Government counsel in the
Wilson case has stated that had defendants decided to go to trial he would have moved
the record of the hearing on preliminary injunction and rested the plaintiff's case. Interview with Joel Davidow, Department of Justice, Antitrust Division, in Washington, D.C.,
Oct. 22, 1968. See FED. R. Civ. P. 65(a).
58. E.g., United States v. FMC Corp., supra note 33.
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of its preliminary injunction motion. Recently there has been a trend toward injunctive relief other than that provided for by Section 15 of the Clayton Act. 59
Coupled with a pre-merger notification statute, 60 the preliminary injunction could
become a powerful weapon in the antitrust arsenal. Were such notification required,
the government would have sufficient time to initiate the preliminary injunction
motion without the danger of the merger being completed before a complaint could be
filed. Should Wilson be indicative of a trend that would find district court judges
more readily disposed toward granting preliminary injunctions, the real trials of antitrust cases may be found in hearing transcripts rather than in full-blown trials on
the merits. Since the standard is one of probability of violation, and the outcome, at
the discretion of the judge, may be a nonappealable decree in effect barring the merger,
some hard cases for defendants could result.
59. See FTC v. Dean Foods Co., 384 U.S. 597 (1966) (authorizes Federal Trade
Commission to seek preliminary injunction in courts of appeals under the All-Writs
Act); Bank Merger Act of 1966, 80 Stat. 7 (1966), 12 U.S.C. § 1828 (Supp. II 1966)
(preliminary injunction automatically granted when government files a complaint against
a proposed merger).
60. Such legislation has been proposed in the past but never adopted. See H.R. Doc.
No. 2718, 85th Cong., 2d Sess. (1959); H.R. Doc. No. 486, 85th Cong., Ist Sess. (1957).

Attorney-Client-Disciplinary Action for Drafting Unnatural Will
with Self Named Beneficiary-State v. Collentine, 39 Wis. 2d 325,
159 N.W.2d 50 (1968).
In a disciplinary action1 against attorney John R. Collentine, the Wisconsin Board of
State Bar Commissioners alleged that Collentine drafted a will for Jane S. Skidmore
providing, with the exception of a single bequest of personal property, that Collentine
himself was to inherit the entire residue of her estate. The defendant admitted the
charge, but claimed to have acted in accordance with the prevailing rule of State v.
Horan2 because, at the time of the execution, he knew that the estate was insolvent
and that as conditions existed then, he would receive nothing. Collentine also contended
that he had suggested to the testatrix that she get another attorney to draw up her
will, and that she had refused to do so. These facts were clearly supported by the
1. Pursuant to Wis. STAT. ANN. § 256.28(8) (1957):
Three or more residents of the state, one of whom shall be the district attorney of the county wherein the misconduct complained of occurred . . .
after an investigation, may make written complaint against any person described
in subsection (7)

.

. .

. The complaint may be either positive, or on informa-

tion and belief, and must be signed and verified by the oath or affirmation of
those who make it. It must . . . state with clearness and certainty the facts

constituting the alleged misconduct of the defendant. It shall be presented to a
justice of the supreme court.
2. 21 Wis. 2d 66, 123 N.W.2d 488 (1963).
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evidence. The referee found an inference of undue influence by virtue of the fact
that defendant was chief beneficiary under the will, and recommended that defendant
be disciplined by a three-month suspension from the practice of law.
The Wisconsin Supreme Court declined to follow the referee's recommendation
for discipline 3 because of the arguable merits of the defendant's interpretation of
Horan. Horan dealt extensively with the problem of scrivener-beneficiaries of unnatural wills, and resulted in a rule designed to prevent the drafting of such wills in
the future. The present case is an extension of Horan and sets down for prospective
application an absolute prohibition against such wills.
In Horan, the defendant drew a series of wills for his client, and at the latter's
insistence, with no element of fraud or undue influence involved, included himself as
a major beneficiary in each of the wills. When one of these wills was offered for
probate a number of the testator's relatives and friends objected to its admission. Subsequently, a stipulation was entered into whereby the objections to the will were withdrawn upon an agreement that certain payments would be made to the relatives and
4
friends. The will was admitted to probate following court approval of the stipulations.
Later, a disciplinary proceeding was commenced against Horan, grounded solely on
the basis that his conduct constituted a disservice to his client amounting to unprofessional conduct. 5 The court in Horan deemed a reprimand and payment of costs
sufficient punishment because it felt that the bar had failed to give sufficient consideration to the problems created by the practice of drafting unnatural wills and "[b]ecause
the law on this subject has not been clearly defined or well understood by the members
of the legal profession ... "6 In reaching this result the court set down a rule which
severely restricted the circumstances under which an unnatural will might thereafter
be justified. Noting that when such a will is drafted an inference of undue influence
arises, 7 the court said:
Ordinarily a lawyer should not draw a will under circumstances which give
rise to the inference of undue influence. He should draw a will in these circumstances only after fully advising his client of the effect thereof and when
he is justified in believing that there is or will be independent competent
evidence which rebuts the inference. 8
The defendant in the present case had tried in vain to avoid drafting the will which
led to the disciplinary hearing against him. He made a sincere effort and took steps
to show that no undue influence was involved and to insure that his actions were
3. State v. Collentine, 39 Wis. 2d 325, 159 N.W.2d 50 (1968).
4. State v. Horan, supra note 2, at 69, 123 N.W.2d at 489.
5. Id. at 67, 123 N.W.2d at 488. The facts were stipulated and it was admitted that
this was a test case.
6. Id. at 75, 123 N.W.2d at 492.
7. See Haman v. Preston, 186 Iowa 1292, 173 N.W. 894 (1919); Moll v. Pollack,
319 Mo. 744, 8 S.W.2d 38 (1928) ; In re Putnam's Will, 257 N.Y. 140, 177 N.E. 399
(1931); In re Hayes' Estate, 49 Misc. 2d 152, 267 N.Y.S.2d 452 (Sur. Ct. 1966); In
re Barnes' Estate, 14 Wis. 2d 643, 112 N.W.2d 142 (1961); In re Faulks' Will, 246 Wis.
319, 17 N.W.2d 423 (1945). See also Note, 31 CORNELL L.Q. 80 (1945); Note, 1945
Wis. L. REV. 633; Comment, 34 TUL. L. REV. 585 (1960).
8. State v. Horan, supra note 2, at 75, 123 N.W.2d at 492.
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within the narrow area where Horan indicated such wills might be justified. The court,
recognizing his good faith, refused to discipline him; however, they did state that
"[w]e are satisfied that the conduct of Collentine was nevertheless within the realm of
that which was intended to be prohibited in Horan."9 (Emphasis added.) Because
the language in Horan could be interpreted to create a technical exception to the rule
against unnatural wills, the court, "[i]n order to prevent future misunderstandings"
(misunderstandings which the court felt might result from a reliance on the language
of Horan and the ignoring of its spirit), established as a rule for "prospective application" that:
a lawyer may be the scrivener of a will in which he is a beneficiary only
when he stands in relationship to the testator as the natural object of the
testator's bounty and where under the will he receives no more than would
be received by law in the absence of a will. Under any other circumstances
in which the lawyer-draftsman is a beneficiary, this court will conclude that
the preparation of such a will constitutes unprofessional conduct.
When a testator wishes to have his attorney draft a will in which that
attorney is entitled to anything more than he would be at law, it is the
absolute duty of the attorney to refuse to act. 10 (Emphasis added.)
The Wisconsin Supreme Court, in this extension of Horan, has taken every element
of choice in these matters away from the attorney. In so doing, the court follows the
rejection made in Horan of the thinking of two eminent authorities on legal ethics,
Orkin and Drinker, 11 on the ground that their views "do not sufficiently consider the
effects of such beneficiary's participation in the making of the will . . . in light of
conflict of interest, the incompetency of the attorney-beneficiary to testify, 12] or the
effect on the integrity of the bar in the eyes of the public."'13
Many other courts have had to deal with the problems created by beneficiary
participation in the drafting of a will. The most common approach to solving problems
related to this practice has been to raise an inference or presumption of undue influence and then to allow the attorney-beneficiary the opportunity to rebut that inference or presumption. 14 In only a very few cases has the attorney-beneficiary been
subjected to disciplinary action in cases where the inference or presumption has been

9. State v. Collentine, supra note 3, at 331, 159 N.W.2d at 53.
10. Id. at 332, 159 N.W.2d at 53.
11. See M. ORKIN, LEGAL ETHICS 104 (1957); H. DRINKER, LEGAL ETHICS 94
(1953). Drinker states that in the absence of undue influence, or when "a testator is
entirely competent and the relation has been a longstanding one, and where the suggestion originates with testator, there is no necessity of having another lawyer in the
case of a reasonable legacy .... "
12. The Wisconsin Dead Man Statute, Wis. STAT. ANN. § 885.16 (1966) provides:
No party or person in his own behalf or interest, and no person from,
through or under whom a party derives his interest or title, shall be examined
as a witness in respect to any transaction or communication by him personally
with a deceased or insane person in any civil action or proceeding, in
which the opposite party derives his title or sustains his liability to the cause of
action from, through or under such deceased or insane person ....
13. See State v. Horan, supra note 2, at 71-72, 123 N.W.2d at 490-91.
14. See cases cited note 7 supra.
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rebutted. 15 The Wisconsin court is the first to exert an absolute standard for the
drafting by attorneys of unnatural wills in which they are named beneficiaries. The
attempt to limit this practice is understandable. The dangers listed by the court in
Horani 6 which a lawyer must consider before drafting an unnatural will are real and
obvious ones. A New Jersey court has taken this view:
[b]y the ancient civil law (the Roman law) a will prepared by a draftsman
in favor of himself was void . . . . Our law or that of England never went to
that extent. If such was made our rule by statute it would have much to
recommend it. Invariably it happens that when attorneys draw wills for
clients, in which they write down themselves or their families as beneficiaries,
they leave themselves open to the suspicion of having exercised improper
influence over the testator under the cover of the trust and confidence which
the average client reposes in his attorney. When such a situation arises-where
a testator wishes to make his attorney the beneficiary-ordinary prudence
requires that such will be drawn by some other lawyer of the testator's
choosing. Suspicion of improper influence may thus be avoided. 17 (Emphasis
added.)
Despite this dicta, the court held that the true rule in New Jersey still requires the
proof of some fact or facts suggestive of fraud or undue influence in addition to the
confidential relationship between the testator and the beneficiary before the burden
of proving "no undue influence" will shift to the beneficiary. The court stated further,
"[i]t should not be overlooked that those occupying a confidential relationship to a
testator will oftentimes be benefited in his will and that such relationship, when it
is genuine and sincere, raises no implication of fraud or undue influence." 18
The Wisconsin court pointed out the pitfalls open to the scrivener-beneficiary in
both Horan and the present case. Other courts 19 view this situation in much the
same light as the Wisconsin court and treat their attorneys in a similar manner. One
can question, however, whether this absolute prohibition is in the best interest of
the public and the profession. It is indeed a natural concern for the bar to protect
its image. The referee in the principal case stated that "Collentine could not qualify
to be a legal beneficiary because he was not related to the testatrix . . . and was in a
confidential relationship. He concluded that Collentine's attempt to benefit from a will
that he drafted would lead the public to question the integrity of the bar."20 (Emphasis
added.) Obviously the profession's "public image" is important. However, it is
15. See Magee v. State Bar, 58 Cal. 2d 423, 374 P.2d 807, 24 Cal. Rptr. 839 (1962) ;
State v. Haberla, 39 Wis. 2d 334, 159 N.W.2d 11 (1968); State v. Eisenberg, 29 Wis. 2d
233, 138 N.W.2d 235 (1965) ; State v. Horan, supra note 2.
16. State v. Horan, supra note 2, at 70, 123 N.W.2d at 490. Among the dangers
which the court listed were: conflict of interests, incompetency of the attorney-beneficiary
to testify, possible jeopardy of the will if its admission to probate is contested, possible
harm done to other beneficiaries, and undermining of the public trust and confidence in
the integrity of the legal profession.
17. In re Nixon's Will, 136 N.J. Eq. 242, 245, 41 A.2d 119, 120 (1945).
18. Id. at 244, 41 A.2d at 120.
19. Magee v. State Bar, supra note 15; State ex rel. State Bar Ass'n v. Richards, 165
Neb. 80, 84 N.W.2d 136 (1957) ; In re Dengler's Estate, 13 Pa. D.&C.2d 193 (Orphans'
Ct. 1958). See generally Annot., 98 A.L.R.2d 1234 (1964).
20. State v. Collentine, supra note 3, at 330, 159 N.W.2d at 52.
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suggested that its "public service" as well as its "client service" are no less important.
A way must be found to maintain all three at the highest possible level.
The pitfalls listed by the court in Horan are important and must always be considered. No conflict of interests between the attorney and the client should ever be
permitted. In cases such as the present one, however, the presumption of undue
influence which arises if there is a contest would reveal the conflict if one existed,
and the court could act accordingly. While the attorney-beneficiary's incompetency to
testify is a serious problem, as Horan points out, a more proper remedy for this
problem might be to further restrict the application of the dead man statute, or, as
some commentators have suggested, to abandon it altogether 21 on the ground that
its application causes more injustice to the living than it does justice to the dead.
The possible jeopardy of the will, if contested, and the possible harm done to the
other beneficiaries might be offset in the case of an unnatural will by recognizing partial
invalidity.
Although the bar's image is likely to suffer whenever the public or the press learns
of the drafting of such a will, nevertheless, where an attorney is faced with the situation in which his client insists that the will include a bequest to the attorney, or where,
as in the present case, the client felt that she was paying for the attorney's legal skills,
and that she was "not going to have somebody else looking in on my things," 22 the attorney is faced with a most difficult choice. Under the Wisconsin rule he has no choice
because of its strictness. If the Wisconsin attorney refuses to act and the client refuses
to seek other counsel, either no will will be drawn, thereby defeating the client's
wishes, or the client may attempt to draft a will without professional advice, certainly
an undesirable outcome.
Judging the conduct of the attorney apart from the will's validity or invalidity appears unduly harsh. While recognizing the advisability of counseling one's client to
seek other counsel when an unnatural will is to be drawn, in the cases where this is
impossible, for whatever honest reason, the attorney's conduct should be judged only
in relation to the particular will he has drafted. If no contest develops, the attorney's propriety in drafting such a will might speak for itself; if a question remains,
the court may itself act upon it.23 If a contest does develop, the facts which will lead
to either the condemnation or the exoneration of the attorney's behavior will be
brought out. In any event, the testator's wishes will be protected and carried out by
following these standards. Particularly in cases such as Horan and Collentine, where
there was no suggestion of fraud or undue influence or any over-reaching on the
part of the attorney, the rule adopted by the Wisconsin Supreme Court seems aimed
at punishing "possible" ill effects rather than "proven" ones.
21. See Taay & Mertz, Some Leading Wisconsin Evidentiary Rules and Suggestions
for Their Improvement, 26 MARQ. L. REv. 65, 70-72 (1942).
22. State v. Collentine, supra note 3, at 329, 159 N.W.2d at 52.
23. See In re Hayes' Estate, supra note 7, where the court denied probate upon an
inference of undue influence, despite the fact that the contestants did not come foreward
and offer any proof that the propounded will was the product of undue influence, because
the proponent, an attorney who shared the residue of the estate with his son and who
had drafted the propounded will, did not offer the court an explanation to rebut the
inference.
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The Code of Ethics is important to every attorney. No attorney should be allowed to ignore or flaunt it. As important as it is, however, it is a hindrance to the
profession if it stands between the attorney and his client in such a manner as to
prevent the attorney from giving his full ability and service to that client. The cases
will necessarily be rare where Collentine might be avoided. Most attorneys are men
of integrity. Even in states which do not follow the Wisconsin rule, attorneys will
attempt to avoid drafting unnatural wills. However, if drafting such a will is the only
means of providing professional service and the only means of seeing the client's
wishes carried out, it appears unduly harsh to discipline an attorney for this conduct.

Constitutional Law-First Amendment-FCC-Personal Attack
Rules-Radio Television News Directors Association v. FCC, 400
F.2d 1002 (7th Cir. 1968)
The Federal Communication Commission's Fairness Doctrine has again come under
attack. The Commission's rules concerning the broadcasting of personal attacks and
political editorials, which implement the Fairness Doctrine, have been ruled unconstitutional by the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals in Radio Television News Directors
Association v. FCC1 (hereinafter Radio Television). The Fairness Doctrine obliges all
commercial radio and television stations to air all sides of any controversial issue of
public importance once the station presents one view. On July 5, 1967, the FCC
adopted a Memorandum Opinion and Order 2 (July 5 Rules) promulgating the
personal attack rules. The July 5 Rules were explained by the Commission as "simply
a particular aspect of the Fairness Doctrine," and did "not alter or add to the sub4
stance of the Doctrine." 3 Following the procedures of the Judicial Review Act,
several broadcasting interests petitioned the court to review and set aside the July 5
Rules. The Radio Television decision conflicts with the District of Columbia Circuit
Court of Appeals decision in Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC5 (Red Lion), which
upheld the Doctrine and its then uncodified personal attack rules.
The July 5 Rules were issued "to codify the procedures which licensees are required
to follow in personal attack situations" and "to implement . . . rulings as to station
editorials endorsing or opposing political candidates. ' 6 A personal attack has been
1. 400 F.2d 1002 (7th Cir. 1968), petition for cert. filed, 37 U.S.L.W. 3185 (U.S.
Nov. 2, 1968) (No. 717).
2.32 Fed. Reg. 10303 (1967).
3. Ibid.
4. 28 U.S.C. § 2342 (Supp. 11 1965-66).
5. 381 F.2d 908 (D.C. Cir.),. cert. granted, 389 U.S. 968 (1967), noted in 17
CATHOLIC U.L. REV. 116 (1967). Oral argument before the Supreme Court in Red
Lion has been postponed pending action on any petition for certiorari filed in Radio
Television. Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 390 U.S. 916 (1968).
6. Notice of Proposed Rule Making, 31 Fed. Reg. 5710 (1966).
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viewed by the Commission as an attack on an individual's or group's integrity,
character, honesty, or personal qualities in connection with controversial public issues. 7
In part, these rules require that when a personal attack has been aired, "the licensee
shall . . . transmit to the person or group attacked (1) notification . . . of the broadcast; (2) a script or tape (or an accurate summary if a script or tape is not available)
of the attack; and (3) an offer of a reasonable opportunity to respond over the
licensee's facilities." 8 These requirements are "inapplicable ... where personal attacks
are made by legally qualified candidates . . . on other such candidates ....- 9 The
July 5 Rules have been revised twice; the first revision made the personal attack rules
inapplicable "to the bona fide newscast or on-the-spot coverage of a bona fide news
event," 10 and the second exempted "bona fide news interviews" and the news "commentary or analysis" contained in either bona fide newscasts, bona fide news interviews, or on-the-spot coverage of news events. 11
The petitioners in Radio Television contended that the Commission's twice-amended
rules would "impose unconstitutional burdens on the freedom of the press protected by
the first amendment," 12 and that the vague terms of the Commission's rules would add
materially to the unconstitutional burden they impose. 13 The Commission's main
argument was that, while the first amendment is applicable to the broadcast media
as well as to the newspapers, " 'different rules and standards are appropriate for
different media of expression in light of their differing natures.' "14
Relying on two Supreme Court decisions, 15 the Seventh Circuit established two
general premises: first, that vague laws will be tolerated less when first amendment
7. Public Notice of July 25, 1964, Applicability of the Fairness Doctrine in the
Handling of Controversial Issues of Public Importance, 29 Fed. Reg. 10415, 10420-21

(1964).
8.32 Fed. Reg. 10305 (1967).
9.Ibid.
10. Id.at 11531.
11. 33 Fed. Reg. 5363 (1968).
12. Radio Television News Directors Ass'n v. FCC, supra note 1, at 1010. Petitioners'
first amendment arguments were: (1) Licensees will incur prohibitive expense in
complying with the requirements of notification, free transcript or tape, and donation
of free time for reply. In addition, the airing of replies will cause the disruption of
commercial programing. Thus, a licensee will tend to decline from airing personal attacks or political editorials rather than suffer the economic loss resultant from compliance with the rules. (2) Licensees will be inhibited from speaking out on controversial topics and elections if to do so means that they will have to allow the airing
of the unorthodox position on that topic or election. (3) Licensees will be reluctant to
air controversial issues due to their uncertainty concerning the application of the Commission's rules to the given situation. (4) Spontaneity in programing will be impeded because the rules require the licensee to determine on a broadcast-by-broadcast
basis whether compliance with the rules has been met. (5) Network-affiliated licensees
will be reluctant to carry controversial network programing because the affiliate will
have to air the network's programmed response or else be required to comply independently with the rules. (6) Licensees will impose stringent censorship on others
who use their broadcast facilities, since the licensee is responsible for all material aired
on his station regardless of its origin.
13. Id. at 1010.
14. Id. at 1011.
15. Ashton v. Kentucky, 384 U.S. 195, 200 (1966); NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S.
415, 432, 433 (1963).
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rights are infringed than when other constitutional rights are involved; and second, that
the government can regulate in first amendment areas only with narrow specificity. 16
In discussing the first amendment's guaranty of freedom of the press, the court
interpreted the series of recent Supreme Court decisions beginning with New York
Times Co. v. Sullivan 17 to mean that "freedom of the press to disseminate views on
issues of public importance must be protected from the imposition of unreasonable
burdens by governmental action." 18 The court agreed with the petitioners that the
effect of the personal attack rules is to inhibit a licensee's airing of political editorials
and controversial issues. This inhibition stems from economic cost and other "practical
burdens" resulting from compliance with the rules. 19
The court rejected the Commission's contention that different rules and standards
apply to the different news media. The court felt that the Commission's argument
begged the question-that is, whether the need for technical, financial, and ownership regulation of radio and television licensees sufficiently distinguishes this group
from newspaper publishers so as to warrant subjecting licensees to burdens that would
be violative of the first amendment if applied to newspapers. The Commission's reliance on the concept of public ownership of. space or airways to justify treating the
broadcast press differently than the printed press the court viewed as "'[1]ogically...
meaningless. To say that the airways or spectrum can be owned by anyone is simply
to indulge in fantasy.' "20 The court also agreed with petitioners that such terms in the
rules as "attack," "character," and "like personal qualities" were too vague.
The Seventh Circuit's decision was contrary to the positions developed over the
years by all three branches of government which, in effect, constituted the Fairness
Doctrine. Congressional debates leading to the passage of the Radio Act of 192721
expressed an intent that "the broadcasting privilege will not be a right of selfishness.
It will rest upon an assurance of public interest to be served."122 Therefore, to acquire a
license, the Radio Commission (the FCC's predecessor) required that the radio station
operate for "the public convenience, interest, or necessity ....
,'23 Today, this still
24
remains a primary consideration when the FCC grants a broadcast application.
In 1938 the FCC moved toward the Fairness Doctrine when, in Young People's Association for the Propagation of the Gospel,25 it denied an application for a construction permit because the applicant refused to permit use of its broadcast facilities for
presentation of positions differing from its own. In another case the Commission,
16. Radio Television News Directors Ass'n v. FCC, supra note 1, at 1011.
17. 376 U.S. 254 (1964); see also Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374 (1967).
18. Radio Television News Directors Ass'n v. FCC, supra note 1, at 1012.
19. Ibid. The court failed to indicate whether it accepted all of petitioners' arguments,
for it did not discuss each assertion individually.
20. Id. at 1019, quoting from Robinson, The F.C.C. and the FirstAmendment: Observations on 40 Years of Radio and Television Regulations, 52 MINN. L. REV. 67, 152
(1967); see also Sullivan, Editorials and Controversy: The Broadcaster's Dilemma,
32 GEo. WASH. L. REV. 719 (1964).
21. Radio Act of 1927, ch. 169, 44 Stat. 1162 (repealed 1934).
22. 67 CONG. Rrc. 5479 (1926) (remarks of Rep. White of Maine).
23. Radio Act of 1927, ch. 169, § 21, 44 Stat. 1170 (repealed 1934).
24. Communications Act of 1934 § 309, 48 Stat. 1085, 47 U.S.C. § 309 (1964).
25. 6 F.C.C. 178 (1938).
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responding to an application for a license renewal by a radio station that chose to
editorialize in a one-sided fashion, stated:
Freedom of speech on the radio must be broad enough to provide full and
equal opportunity for the presentation to the public of all sides of public
issues. Indeed, as one licensed to operate in a public domain the licensee
has assumed the obligation of presenting all sides of important public questions, fairly, objectively and without bias. The public interest-not the
26
private-is paramount.
Other Commission rulings have adhered to this doctrine and have, in fact, broadened
27
the scope of its coverage.
The basic requirements of the Fairness Doctrine were outlined in the Report to the
Commission in the Matter of Editorializing by Broadcast Licensees28 (1949 Report).
The 1949 Report codified earlier fairness rulings, and informed broadcasters that
they could editorialize but must present a reasonable balance of viewpoints on important public issues. The 1949 Report states the underlying policy reason for this
decision:
The basis for any fair consideration of public issues, and particularly those of
a controversial nature, is the presentation of news and information concerning the basic facts of the controversy in as complete and impartial a manner
as possible. A licensee would be abusing his position . . . were he to withhold
from expression over his facilities relevant news or facts concerning a con29
troversy or to slant or distort the presentation of such news.
Congress indicated its approval of the Fairness Doctrine in 1959 when it amended
Section 315 (a) of the Communications Act to read in part:
Nothing . . . shall be construed as relieving broadcasters, in connection with
the presentation of newscasts, news interviews, news documentaries, and onthe-spot coverage of news events, from the obligation imposed upon them
under this [Act] to operate in the public interest and to afford reasonable opportunity for the discussion of conflicting views on issues of public im30
portance.
The history of this amendment makes it clear that Congress intended to enact the
concept of the Fairness Doctrine.31 After the 1959 Amendment, the Commission
considered cases on an ad hoc basis. 32 Upon additional research and study, the

26. Mayflower Broadcasting Corp., 8 F.C.C. 333, 340 (1940).
27. Lawrence W. Harry, 13 F.C.C. 23 (1948); WBNX Broadcasting Co., 12 F.C.C.
805 (1948) ; United Broadcasting Co., 10 F.C.C. 515 (1945).
28. 13 F.C.C. 1246 (1949).
29. Id. at 1254-55.
30. Communications Act of 1934 § 315, 48 Stat. 1088, as amended, 73 Stat. 557
(1959), 47 U.S.C. § 315 (1964).
31. S. REP. No. 562, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. 1959); H. R. REP. No. 802, 86th
Cong., 1st Sess. (1959); 105 CONO. REc. 16310, 16346-47 (1959).
32. The Commission forecasted this procedure. 1949 Report, supra note 28, at 1256.
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Commission issued in 1964 the Fairness Primer,33 which again emphasized that
broadcast facilities must be maintained as a medium of free speech. The Fairness
Primer contained a separate section devoted to the personal attack concept, requiring that broadcasters afford the person attacked the fullest opportunity to respond
over the licensee's facilities.
Red Lion was the first direct constitutional test of the Fairness Doctrine. A radio
station challenged a Commission order, predating the July 5 Rules, requiring the
station to make free reply time available to a person who had been attacked. The
court affirmed the constitutionality of the doctrine. Thus vindicated, the Commission followed Red Lion with the adoption of the July 5 Rules, which were set aside
in Radio Television.
Despite the Seventh Circuit's characterization of its decision as disagreeing with
Red Lion, it is uncertain whether the two courts disagree or whether the Seventh Circuit passed upon an issue which the District of Columbia Circuit never discussed.
The Seventh Circuit limits its holding to the July 5 Rules themselves, and views the fact
that the D.C. Circuit affirmed an order containing these rules in their uncodified
form as the source of the disagreement. Yet, the D.C. court affirmed the order on
the basis of the constitutionality of the Fairness Doctrine alone; there is no evidence
in Red Lion that the court examined the order, except for the portion providing for
free time. The two decisions, placed side by side, are confusing because the D.C. court
failed to state with precision what it was doing, and because the Seventh Circuit did
34
not take this failure into account when it handed down its decision.
It is clear that the two courts do disagree over the "free time" provision of the
rules. While the Supreme Court need not clarify the confused reasoning in these two
decisions, it must pass upon the "free time" provision. One decision must be at least
reversed in part; the Court cannot tell the FCC to rewrite its rules by affirming
both decisions or by denying certiorari in Radio Television.
The Supreme Court may hold that the Fairness Doctrine is unconstitutional and
thereby avoid the issues raised in Radio Television. The Fairness Doctrine, as abstract
philosophy, seems sound; the mass communications media should be fair because the
"vitality of civil and political institutions in our society depends on free discussion. ' 35
The significance of Radio Television is that it brings to light the paradox that develops
in the practical application of rules intended to promote fairness. The burden imposed by the operation of the rules may be so heavy as to create an "Unfairness
Doctrine."

33. Public Notice of July 25, 1964, Applicability of the Fairness Doctrine in the
Handling of Controversial Issues of Public Importance, 29 Fed. Reg. 10415 (1964).
34. The Judicial Review Act provides interested parties with the opportunity to challenge newly adopted FCC rules before the rules have been applied to an actual case or
controversy. Courts must anticipate the real effect of these rules; such anticipation may
result in a confused opinion. Perhaps a great deal of the confusion in Radio Television
would have been avoided if the Seventh Circuit had been dealing with an actual case
or controversy rather than with the mere expectation of one.
35. Terminiello v. Chicago, 337 U.S. 1, 4 (1949).
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Constitutional Law-Judicial Review of Prison RegulationsPrisoners' Right to Communicate-Jackson v. Godwin, 400 F.2d
529 (5thCir. 1968).
Jackson, a twenty-seven year old Negro inmate at Florida State Prison, filed a handwritten complaint against the state superintendent under the Federal Civil Rights Act
of 1871,1 alleging that prison rules and regulations concerning mail privileges deprived
him of equal protection of the laws by arbitrarily denying him the right to receive
Negro newspapers and magazines. Forced to read only white newspapers and magazines and denied access to Negro publications, Jackson argued that, as a Negro, he
"was kept ignorant and uninformed as to news and events in the Negro community." 2
The United States District Court for the Middle District of Florida denied Jackson
relief on the grounds that control of the mail was an important part of the administration and maintenance of prison discipline, that it was not the duty of the federal
courts to superintend the general administration of state prisons, and that courts would
interfere with the enforcement of rules and regulations only in extreme cases.3 In
reversing, the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit refused to adopt such a noninterventionist approach, stating that: "[I]n the area of arbitrary official action in
the administration of prisons which involves the constitutional rights of inmates to be
free from racial discrimination and to enjoy the 'preferred' freedoms of the First
Amendment courts will not shrink from scrutinizing administrative actions." 4 Finding
the regulations arbitrary and discriminatory, the court ordered prison authorities to
refrain from denying Jackson and other Negro inmates "the full and equal protection
of the laws, free from racial discrimination, and the fullest enjoyment, within normal
prison order, and equal enjoyment of First Amendment rights, free from arbitrary
censorship and suppression .... 5

The willingness with which the court undertook to review prison administrative
action, and the strong protective attitude it voiced toward Jackson's first amendment
right to communicate with outside society represent a marked departure from previous
judicial handling of prisoner mistreatment claims.
The Hands-Off Policy
The rationale of noninterference adopted by the district court, often labeled the
"hands-off" doctrine, is typical of many decisions involving the validity of prison
administrative regulations. Based on the belief that courts possess neither the time
nor expertise to supervise the minute details of prison administration, the doctrine
holds that courts are "without power to supervise prison administration or to interfere
with the ordinary prison rules or regulations."' 6 Accordingly, the authority of prison
I.REv. STAT. § 1979 (1875),42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1964).
2. Jackson v. Godwin, 400 F.2d 529, 531 (5th Cir. 1968).
3. Id. at 531-32.
4. Id. at 535.
5. Id. at 543.
6. Banning v. Looney, 213 F.2d 771 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 348 U.S. 859 (1954).
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officials has been deemed discretionary and upheld in cases involving regulations allowing wardens to censor lists of persons with whom inmates may communicate, and
restrict the number of letters that inmates may send. 7 Similarly, courts have refused
to examine prison restrictions on book purchasing8 and the taking of correspondence
courses. 9

The shortcomings inherent in the policy of noninterference are twofold. First, any
rights which a prisoner may have remain unenforceable as long as courts dismiss cases
for lack of competency to hear the complaint. Second, an unquestioning acceptance
of apparently valid administrative measures in the name of noninterference tends to
result in a pattern of review whereby courts refuse to probe beneath the surface of
these regulations to the manner and effect of their application. The shift away from
the hands-off policy has already begun, and, in at least two areas of prison regulation
review, the approach seems to have been completely abandoned. In dealing with
administrative restrictions on prisoners' access to the courts, or upon their exercise
of religious freedom, the courts have not hesitated to interfere with such restrictions,
even when jusification is sought on the grounds of internal discipline control.
The shift from nonintervention began when the courts were called upon to protect
access to the courts themselves. The Supreme Court, for example, declared invalid
state prison regulations requiring a prisoner's legal documents to
officials before being forwarded to the courts. 10 The Court has also
protection of the laws is denied to a prisoner when he is prevented
taking a timely appeal. 11 A Maryland court, in dictum, has declared

be approved by
ruled that equal
by officials from
that a petitioner

has an absolute right to petition for habeas corpus, and that prison officials cannot
12
refuse to forward a petition or restrict its size or contents.
These cases generally involve efforts by the inmate to challenge, either directly or
collaterally, the validity of his conviction. Nevertheless, they represent an initial inroad into the hands-off doctrine as a whole, both by establishing the first area in
which courts talked of prisoner rights rather than privileges and by opening the
door to the effective vindication of other prisoner rights as they have been recognized.
In recent years, Black Muslim prisoners have increasingly demanded the right to
freely exercise their religion. 13 Many courts, perhaps responding to the "preferred"
status of this first amendment right,14 have been unwilling to permit the denial of
7. E.g., Labat v. McKeithen, 361 F.2d 757 (5th Cir. 1966); Lee v. Tahash, 352
F.2d 970 (8th Cir. 1965); McCloskey v. Maryland, 337 F.2d 72 (4th Cir. 1964)
Ortega v. Ragen, 216 F.2d 561 (7th Cir. 1954), cert. denied, 349 U.S. 940 (1955).
8. Carey v. Settle, 351 F.2d 483 (8th Cir. 1965).
9. Numer v. Miller, 165 F.2d 986 (9th Cir. 1948).
10. Ex parte Hull, 312 U.S. 546 (1941).
11. Dowd v. United States ex rel. Cook, 340 U.S. 206 (1951); Cochran v. Kansas,
316 U.S. 255 (1942).
12. Warfield v. Raymond, 195 Md. 711, 713, 71 A.2d 870, 871 (1950).
13. E.g., Cooper v. Pate, 382 F.2d 518 (7th Cir. 1967); Muhammad v. McGinnis,
362 F.2d 587 (2d Cir. 1966) ; Walker v. Blackwell, 360 F.2d 66 (5th Cir. 1966);
Sostre v. McGinnis, 334 F.2d 906 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 892 (1964)
Roberts v. Pegelow, 313 F.2d 548 (4th Cir. 1963); Pierce v. LaVallee, 293 F.2d 233
(2d Cir. 1961). See Frankino, The Menacles and the Messenger, 14 CATHOLIC U.L.
RaV. 30 (1965).
14. See, e.g., Pierce v. LaVallee, supra note 13, at 235.
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religious freedom even when based on the ground of administrative control of prison
discipline, which generally has been held to justify the denial of "lesser" rights.
As early as 1961, however, such a rationale was not yet prevalent, and the courts were
still reluctant to interfere even in this area. The California Supreme Court in In re
Ferguson15 concluded that even if the racially inflammatory Muslim doctrine could
be termed religious, discrimination between Muslims and other religious sects was
an internal disciplinary matter falling within the discretion of penal authorities, and
was not so "extreme"

16

as to be unreasonable under the fourteenth amendment's due

process and equal protection clauses. 17
Recent decisions, however, have shifted away from this view and have invalidated
prison restrictions prohibiting Muslim services and correspondence with spiritual
advisors, 18 and ordering confiscation of religious literature and medals. 19 These cases
have made it clear that prison discrimination merely because of religious beliefs can
no longer be justified solely by inherent prison structural and systematic considerations.
First Amendment and the Right to Communicate
Although Jackson did not specifically claim abridgement of any first amendment freedom, the court seemed to imply that cutting off communication with the Negro community could so seriously impair the free exchange of ideas so jealously protected by
the first amendment as to amount to such an infringement. 20 General recognition of
such a right would open up a whole new area of judicial review previously closed to
prisoners.
The rationale for defeating the hands-off doctrine appeared in dictum in an earlier
Sixth Circuit decision:21 "A prisoner retains all the rights of an ordinary citizen
except those expressly, or by necessary implication, taken from him by law." 2 2 Under
this view a prisoner's constitutional rights are retained, but are subject to restrictions
justifiable as a concomitant of imprisonment or as a consequence of prison environment. In most cases, however, where prisoners have claimed a right under the first
amendment to communicate with persons on the outside, the courts have refused
to reach the merits, on the basis of noninterference with prison administrative dis23
cretionary action.
15. 55 Cal. 2d 663, 361 P.2d 417, 12 Cal. Rptr. 753, cert. denied, 368 U.S. 864
(1961).
16. "It clearly appears to be the general rule that, except in extreme cases, the courts
will not interfere with the conduct of a prison, with the enforcement of its rules and
regulations, or its discipline." (footnote omitted.) Childs v. Pegelow, 321 F.2d 487, 489
(4th Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 376 U.S. 932 (1964) (citing many supporting cases).
17. In re Ferguson, supra note 15, at 672, 361 P.2d at 421, 12 Cal. Rptr. at 757.
18. Cooper v. Pate, supra note 13.
19. Fulwood v. Clemmer, 206 F. Supp. 370 (D.D.C. 1962); State ex rel. Tate v.
Cubbage, 210 A.2d 555 (Del. Super. Ct. 1965).
20. Jackson v. Godwin, supra note 2, at 543.
21. Coffin v. Reichard, 143 F.2d 443 (6th Cir. 1944), cert. denied, 325 U.S. 887
(1945).
22. Id. at 445.
23. E.g., Numer v. Miller, supra note 9; Labat v. McKeithen, 243 F. Supp. 662
(E.D. La. 1965), aff'd, 361 F.2d 757 (5th Cir. 1966); United States ex rel. Thompson
v. Fay, 197 F. Supp. 855 (S.D.N.Y. 1961).
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In a recent case upholding a state statute limiting mail privileges of death row
prisoners, a district court reasoned that since the state has the right to deprive a
man of his life, it could "deprive him of other privileges along the way to the final
24
reckoning" so long as the regulations were nondiscriminatory. The court's employment of the hands-off doctrine avoided reaching the merits of the prisoner's first
amendment arguments. Had the court applied the concept that rights are retained
by prisoners except those which must necessarily be restricted for purposes of incarceration or administrative need, it would have been necessary to go behind the
regulation and examine the reasons for restricting communication.
A right to communicate should be recognized and protected. In the words of
Professor Alexander Meiklejohn, "[t]he First Amendment does not protect a 'freedom
to speak.' It protects the freedom of those activities of thought and communication
by which we 'govern.' "25 Outside prison walls, the right to free expression is cherished
and protected because of the belief that it is only through hearing and weighing all
opinions that individuals can intelligently and effectively participate in responsible
government. Failure to recognize that prisoners have the same need for information
overlooks an important function of our system of penology. Although cut off from
outside society, most prisoners look forward to their release, and want and need to
know and discuss events of interest in both external and prison society. Information
gained only by rumor or half-truth or representing only one point of view may adversely affect inmate decisions regulating immediate and future behavior. The encouragement given to prison newspapers and their discussion of prison events and
26
more general matters is recognition of the importance of prison communication.
Continued contact and interaction with meaningful reference groups are strongly
27
urged for prisoners as important requirements for social stability. Since communication with others is therefore recognized as a prisoner need, effective rehabilitation
28
requires freedom rather than restriction of communication with the outside.
Conclusion
The Federal Civil Rights Act of 1871, under which this case was brought, states
that any person who under color of law or custom deprives any person under the
jurisdiction of the United States of his constitutional or legal rights "shall be liable
to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for
24. Labat v. McKeithen, supra note 23, at 666.
25. Meiklejohn, The First Amendment is an Absolute, 1961 SuP. CT. REv. 245, 255.
26. THE AMERICAN CORRECTIONAL ASSOCIATION, MANUAL OF CORRECTIONAL STANDARDS 551-52 (1966).
27. THE PRISON, STUDIES IN INSTITUTIONAL ORGANIZATION AND CHANGE 363-64
(D. Cressey ed. 1966).
28. "No matter how good the regime inside a prison may be it will fail in its task
of social rehabilitation unless pains are taken to keep the prisoner in touch with the
outside world; to preserve any place he may already have in it so far as this is possible;
and as his sentence nears its end, to increase the number of points at which he can have
experience of it so that he can once more become adept in its ways." H. JONES, CRIME
AND THE PENAL SYSTEM 211 (3d ed. 1965). See MANUAL OF CORRECTIONAL STANDARDS,

supra note 26, at 543.
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redress." 29 Since this act has been held applicable to prisoners, 30 and is applicable to
the enforcement of prison regulations,3 1 the greatest difficulty facing the prisoner who
can establish the fact of mistreatment is proving that a federal right has been violated.
In dealing with prison restrictions on mail privileges, one district court has refused to
consider prisoner claims of first amendment infringement for the reason that "[p]risoners
lawfully confined to state penitentiaries have no absolute right to the use of the
mails." 32 Another district court has stated that, absent any racial discrimination, it
would not interfere with the penal authorities' discretionary power with respect to
mailing privileges.3 3 More recently the Fourth Circuit, on facts similar to those in
Jackson, concluded that the fourteenth amendment forbids discrimination among inmates concerning the right to receive nonsubversive magazines, but nevertheless added
that if "the periodical was denied the petitioner on grounds other than race, then
the court [might] consider refusing to interfere with matters of proper prison discipline."' 34 Although the court in Jackson did find the regulations complained of racially
discriminatory, the emphasis it placed on the prison's violation of Jackson's first
amendment rights may well persuade future courts to allow a claim of a first amendment violation to stand under the Federal Civil Rights Act without reference to the
fourteenth amendment.
In the name of nonintervention, courts have too often refused to look beneath the
surface of many prison regulations to their practical effect. As the court here emphasized, however, "in the area of arbitrary official action in the administration of prisons
which involves the constitutional rights of inmates to be free from racial discrimination and to enjoy the 'preferred' freedoms of the First Amendment courts will not
shrink from scrutinizing administrative actions." 35 The court criticized, for example,
the prison's "hometown newspaper rule," which provided that a prisoner could
subscribe to one newspaper of his choice, but that his choice was restricted to newspapers published in his hometown. Even if even-handedly and not arbitrarily enforced,
the court reasoned, because Negro newspapers are comparatively rare, the hometown
rule inevitably imposed a greater burden on Negroes than whites, and was therefore
36
inherently discriminatory as applied.
Hopefully, this concept of a first amendment right to communicate will provide
yet another weakening of the hands-off approach to prison review. The courts should
continue to review and scrutinize all restrictions on fundamental rights, even when
justification is sought on the ground of administrative control of internal discipline.
29. REV. STAT. § 1979 (1875), 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1964).
30. See Sewell v. Pegelow, 291 F.2d 196, 198 (4th Cir. 1961); Gordon v. Garrson,
77 F. Supp. 477, 479 (E.D. Ill. 1948).
31. Siegel v. Ragen, 88 F. Supp. 996, 998 (N.D. Ill. 1948), aft'd, 180 F.2d 785 (7th
Cir.), cert. denied, 339 U.S. 990 (1950).
32. United States ex rel. Thompson v. Fay, supra note 23, at 856.
33. Labat v. McKeithen, supra note 23.
34. Rivers v. Royster, 360 F.2d 592, 594 (4th Cir. 1966).
35. Jackson v. Godwin, supra note 2, at 535.
36. Id. at 537.
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Criminal Law-Voluntariness of Confessions-Reasonable Doubt
Standard to be Applied in Preliminary Hearing-Pea v. United
States, 397 F.2d 627 (D.C. Cir. 1968).
On the evening of June 28, 1960, a homicide detective of the Metropolitan Police
Department was referred from the scene of a shooting in Washington, D.C. to the
Sibley Memorial Hospital where a suspect was being held. At the hospital the detective found Emanuel Pea, Jr. suffering from a gunshot wound in the right temple. After
informing Pea that he was a police officer, the detective engaged him in a conversation during which Pea admitted that he had shot his wife and thereafter shot himself.
Pea was indicted and convicted of first degree murder and sentenced to death, but
in 1962 the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia vacated
the judgment because Pea had been represented by an imposter-lawyer. 1 Pea was
re-tried, convicted of second degree murder and sentenced to imprisonment for 15
years to life. The judgment was affirmed by the court of appeals, 2 but the Supreme
Court vacated this judgment and remanded the case for further proceedings not
3
inconsistent with its decision in Jackson v. Denno.
In the evidentiary hearing on the voluntariness of Pea's confession in 1966, the
district court found " 'beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant at the time he confessed the killing of his wife was physically and mentally competent to make his confession and that he did so voluntarily.' "4 On appeal, the court of appeals concluded
that the district court erred in failing "to appreciate the constitutional significance
of appellant's helpless state as revealed by medical testimony unrebutted by any record
evidence."' 5 The court felt, however, that an appropriate direction could not be given
to the district court until it was determined whether the prosecution's burden of
proof is governed by the standard of "beyond a reasonable doubt" or by some lesser
standard. The issue was argued before the court sitting en banc. Held: a judicial
determination that a confession is admissible cannot be made unless the judge is
satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt that the confession was voluntary.
By the exercise of its supervisory authority over the administration of criminal
justice in the District of Columbia, the Circuit Court of Appeals in Pea overruled its
holding in Clifton v. United States6 and adopted a rule which more adequately insures that a defendant in a criminal case will not be convicted on the basis of an
involuntary confession. Prior to Jackson, most jurisdictions followed one of three basic
procedures for determining the voluntariness of a confession. 7 The Orthodox (or
1. Peav. United States, No. 16387 (D.C. Cir. July 11, 1962).
2. Pea v. United States, 324 F.2d 442 (D.C. Cir. 1963), vacated, 378 U.S. 571
(1964).
3. 378 U.S. 368 (1964).
4. Pea v. United States, 397 F.2d 627, 631 (D.C. Cir. 1967), modified on rehearing
en banc, id. at 637 (D.C. Cir. 1968).
5. Id. at 636-37.
6. 371 F.2d 354 (D.C. Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 386 U.S. 995 (1967). A full discussion of the significance of this case may be found in 43 N.D. LAW. 115 (1967).
7. See apps. A and B to the dissenting opinion of Mr. Justice Black in Jackson v.
Denno, supra note 3, at 410-23. For a full discussion of the various procedures used
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Wigmore) rule 8 emphasizes the separate functions of judge and jury, maintaining
that it is the province of the court to determine the admissibility of a confession and
that the jury may consider voluntariness only in passing upon the weight to be given
a confession. In contrast, the old New York rule 9 put the burden upon and gave
the authority to the jury to decide the question of voluntariness. The judge, under
this procedure, made a preliminary determination on the question of voluntariness
and if there was no question but that the confession was involuntary he would exclude
it, but if the evidence presented a fair question as to the voluntariness, the judge was
10
required to submit the issue to the jury. The Massachusetts (or Humane) rule strikes
a balance between the Orthodox and the former New York procedures. Under the
Massachusetts standard the judge first resolves the issue of voluntariness to his own
satisfaction, excluding those confessions he deems involuntary. Those confessions which
the judge deems voluntary are then submitted to the jury and the voluntariness of
the confession is re-determined. If the jury decides that the confession was involuntary,
it is then instructed that the confession is to be disregarded in arriving at a verdict.
Jackson declared the New York rule unconstitutional because it did not adequately
protect the defendant's right to be free of a conviction based on a coerced confession.
The Jackson decision, however, was more negative in its analysis than positive. The
Supreme Court denied the validity of the New York procedure but did not attempt
11
to outline a specific procedure which would insure constitutionality. After declaring
12
that the convicting jury may not solely resolve the issue, the Court merely added
that whatever procedures are used must "be fully adequate to insure a reliable and
clear-cut determination of the voluntariness of the confession, including the resolution
13
of disputed facts upon which the voluntariness issue may depend."
The alternatives remaining after Jackson were outlined in a footnote to the opinion
of the Court: "Whether the trial judge, another judge, or another jury, but not the
convicting jury, fully resolves the issue of voluntariness is not a matter of concern
here. . . . [T]he States are free to allocate functions between judge and jury as they
see fit."' 4 The freedom of the states to "allocate functions between judge and jury"
was broader, however, than choosing between a judge or a separate jury to decide the
issue of voluntariness. The states could still choose the Massachusetts rule. Although
the Orthodox rule provided the best protection to the defendant, the Jackson Court

prior to Jackson see Meltzer, Involuntary Confessions: The Allocation of Responsibility
Between Judge and jury, 21 U. CHi. L. REV. 317 (1954).
8. 3 J. WIOMORE, EvmENcE § 861 (3d ed. 1940).
9. E.g., Stein v. New York, 346 U.S. 156 (1953) (overruled by Jackson v. Denno,
supra note 3, at 391).
10. E.g., Commonwealth v. Preece, 140 Mass. 276, 277, 5 N.E. 494, 495 (1885).
11. The Supreme Court has since outlined specific procedures to be followed at
another stage of the confession-taking process. See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436
(1966).
12. Jackson v. Denno, supra note 3, at 391 n.19.
13. Id. at 391.
14. Id. at 391 n.1 9 .
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also supported the Massachusetts rule, primarily because of the "integrity" of the
15
preliminary judicial determination of voluntariness.
Not only did the Court refrain from outlining specific procedures to be followed
in a Jackson v. Denno hearing (as the preliminary evidentiary hearing has come to
be called), but the Court also left undecided the question as to the appropriate
standard of proof necessary at such a hearing. As Mr. Justice Black noted in his
dissenting opinion: "The Court has not said that its new constitutional rule . . .
imposes on the State the burden of proving [voluntariness] beyond a reasonable
doubt."16 Justice Black went on to ask: "Does the Court's new rule allow the judge
to decide voluntariness merely on a preponderance of the evidence? If so, this is a
distinct disadvantage to the defendant. In fashioning its new constitutional rule, the
17
Court should not leave this important question in doubt."
Since the Court did not answer these questions, each jurisdiction has attempted
its own solution. Most of those jurisdictions which had been practicing the Orthodox
rule or the Massachusetts rule continued to do so, but those state and federal courts18
which had 'adhered to the New York rule, or some variation thereof, were faced with
the choice between adopting one of the other two methods, or some acceptable
substitute. The alternative of having another jury decide the issue would be expensive
and impractical and this method has never been used. 19 In addition to choosing the
procedure in these situations, a determination had to be made as to the standard of
proof to be applied by the judge or the separate jury. It would be convenient, for
the purpose of analysis, if those jurisdictions choosing a particular procedure also
chose the same standard of proof, but such has not been the case. Most courts which
have chosen the Orthodox rule 20 have adopted the reasonable doubt standard, 21 but
those which follow the Massachusetts procedure have, relying on the fact that the
determination by the jury is decided beyond a reasonable doubt, selected standards

15. Id. at 378 n.8. The Court did not, unfortunately, discuss how the burden of proof
in the Massachusetts procedure affected its "integrity." See discussion p. 246 infra.
16. Jackson v. Denno, supra note 3, at 405.
17. Ibid.

18. Mr. Justice Black noted in Appendix B to his opinion in Jackson that the District
of Columbia courts followed the New York procedure. This procedure was outlined in
Wright v. United States, 250 F.2d 4, 13 (D.C. Cir. 1957):
In this jurisdiction, however, by "law and practice," the court first holds a
preliminary hearing for the purpose of determining whether there is evidence
from which the jury could properly conclude that the confession was voluntary.
If the court concludes there is no such evidence, it must exclude the confession;
but if it finds there is evidence on the basis of which it might be held to be
voluntary, then the question of voluntariness is submitted to the jury.
19. Comment, An Analysis of the Procedures Used to Determine the Voluntariness

of Confessions: And a Solution, 11 S. DAst. L. REv. 70, 84 (1966).
20. E.g., People v. Walker, 374 Mich. 331, 132 N.W.2d 87 (1965); State ex rel.
Goodchild v. Burke, 27 Wis. 2d 244, 133 N.W.2d 753 (1965), cert. denied, 384 U.S.
1017 (1966).
21. See Clifton v. United States, supra note 6, at 357 n.7; but see note 22 infra.
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couched in such terms as "prima facie," "preponderance of evidence," 22 and "clear,"
23
as well as "beyond a reasonable doubt."
The absence of any specific directions in Jackson has occasioned different courts to
use the same premise to support completely different approaches to the question. The
Supreme Court of Wisconsin has stated: "the determination of whether a confession
is voluntary in substance is a ruling on the admissibility of evidence and there is no
requirement to have a jury trial on such rulings." 2 4 On the basis of this reasoning the
Orthodox rule and the reasonable doubt standard were adopted in Wisconsin.
In Clifton v. United States,25 however, the United States Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia Circuit, working within the framework of the Massachusetts rule
adopted after Jackson2 6 stated: "The determination of whether a confession is voluntary is, in substance, a ruling on its admissibility as evidence.... Nowhere in the law
-civil or criminal-has it ever been thought that a trial judge, in passing on admissibility of evidence in a jury case, must use the reasonable doubt standard." 27 In
Clifton, the majority of the court refused to follow the decisions of the Fourth Circuit
(a Massachusetts procedure jurisdiction) which held that "the District Judge will
evaluate the evidence to ascertain whether, after resolving any conflicts therein, it
28
convinces him beyond a reasonable doubt that the confession was voluntary."
Instead, the Clifton court stated that "since the jury is bound by the reasonable doubt
standard, the logic of those cases requiring the trial judge to use the same standard at
29
his preliminary determination is not compelling."
The argument for the reasonable doubt standard becomes apparent when one considers the Supreme Court's reasoning in invalidating the New York procedure in
Jackson. One of the basic objections to the New York procedure was that if the jury
found the submitted confession to be involuntary, it was required to dismiss it from
the deliberations of the accused's guilt-a formidable psychological task which the
Court felt could not be demanded of the jury. 30 This same task is presented to the
jury under the Massachusetts rule when the judge uses anything less than the reasonable doubt standard. If the judge decides the issue according to a lesser standard
than does the jury, it is quite possible for the jury to arrive at a different conclusion.
The jury is then faced with the same problem as was a New York jury prior to
Jackson. From this point of view, the Supreme Court's approval of the Massachusetts
procedure seems to permit, under the guise of a different rule, the same evils it con-

22. In response to Jackson, Arkansas, which operated under the orthodox rule, specified that the standard to be applied by the judge shall be that of a "preponderance of
the evidence." ARK. STAT. ANN. § 43-2105 (Supp. 1967).
23. For a statistical analysis of the standards used in various jurisdictions, see State
v. Keiser, 274 Minn. 265, 143 N.W.2d 75, 80 (1966).
24. State ex rel. Goodchild v. Burke, supra note 20, at 263, 133 N.W.2d at 763.
25. Supra note 6.
26. See Hutcherson v. United States, 351 F.2d 748 (D.C. Cir. 1965).
27. Clifton v. United States, supra note 6, at 357-58.
28. United States v. Inman, 352 F.2d 954, 956 (4th Cir. 1965). This position was
reaffirmed in the Fourth Circuit twice in 1967: see Morris v. Boles, 386 F.2d 395 (4th
Cir. 1967) ; Mullins v. United States, 382 F.2d 258 (4th Cir. 1967).
29. Clifton v. United States, supra note 6, at 357 n.7.
30. Jackson v. Denno, supra note 3, at 383.
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demned in the New York rule. In its analysis of the Massachusetts rule, the Jackson
Court noted that it is only those confessions already deemed by the judge to be
voluntary that are heard by the jury, and that, under this procedure, a jury may
subsequently find the confession involuntary and ignore it.3 1 It is odd that the Court
could accept this as a valid procedure when it noted in the same opinion:
That a trustworthy confession must also be voluntary if it is to be used at
all, generates natural and potent pressure to find it voluntary. . . . The
danger that matters pertaining to the defendant's guilt will infect the jury's
findings of fact bearing upon voluntariness, as well as its conclusion upon that
issue itself, is sufficiently serious to preclude their unqualified acceptance
upon review in this Court, regardless of whether there is or is not sufficient
32
other evidence to sustain a finding of guilt.
The Court seemed to believe that the Massachusetts procedure has a special quality
which will protect the defendant from this danger: "Given the integrity of the preliminary proceedings before the judge, the Massachusetts procedure does not, in
our opinion, pose hazards to the rights of a defendant. '3 3 (Emphasis added.)
This "integrity" is not evident in the cases. The standard necessary in Massachusetts
34
to get past the judge to the jury with a confession has varied from "prima facie"
37
36
3
to "reasonable presumption" 5 to "any evidence" to "preponderance of evidence"
to, most recently, "sufficient evidence." 38s That the Massachusetts juries do not have
the same substantive problem as the New York juries in passing on the voluntariness
of confessions cannot be shown from the cases. The United States Court of Appeals
for the District of Columbia Circuit recognized the jury's problem as a valid one when
it stated: "The courts need not rest on the assumption that juries can compartmentalize
their minds and hear things for one purpose and not for another." 39 A very practical
argument was advanced by Judge Levanthal in his differing analysis in Clifton:
Practical considerations of proof underscore the importance of the court's
use of the reasonable-doubt standard, notwithstanding a later submission to
the jury. There may be more evidence before the court than before the jury,
for example the testimony of a defendant who dare not risk presentation
of prior convictions to the jury. It would be unjust if such evidence raised
a reasonable doubt only to find that this doubt was ignored by the judge,
under the rule proclaimed by the majority, and was never available to the
40
jury.
In commenting upon the Clifton decision the New Jersey Supreme Court refrained
from adopting the reasonable doubt standard, and noted:
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.

Id. at 378 n.8.
Id. at 382-83.
Id. at 378 n.8.
Commonwealth v. Robinson, 146 Mass. 571, 582, 16 N.E. 452, 457 (1888).
Commonwealth v. Myers, 160 Mass. 530, 532, 36 N.E. 481 (1894).
Commonwealth v. Russ, 232 Mass. 58, 69, 122 N.E. 176, 180 (1919).
Commonwealth v. Polian, 288 Mass. 494, 499, 193 N.E. 68, 70 (1934).
Commonwealth v. Griffin, 345 Mass. 283, 287, 186 N.E.2d 909, 911 (1963).
Awkard v. United States, 352 F.2d 641, 646 (D.C. Cir. 1965).
Clifton v. United States, supra note 6, at 363.
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the holding in Clifton v. United States ...finds support in some cases but not
in others [citations omitted]. Indeed most of the recent decisions impose on
the trial judge the responsibility of finding the confession's admissibility
beyond reasonable doubt although they apparently speak in terms of prefer41
able practice rather than constitutional requirement.
It is in this sense of preferable practice that the District of Columbia court in Pea
overruled Clifton and adopted the reasonable doubt standard for Jackson v. Denno
hearings. 42 The concurring opinion in Clifton, which is now adopted by the court as
the rule for the District of Columbia, examined the constitutional aspects of the issue
and hinted that a sufficient constitutional basis could be found to support the reasonable doubt standard:
That the court making the determination of voluntariness required of the
court by Jackson v. Denno should be governed by the standard of being
convinced beyond a reasonable doubt, and not by the analytically lower
standard of proof to the "satisfaction of the court" which governs findings
of fact involved in ordinary rulings on evidence, is attributable to the distinctive nature of the voluntariness determination. It has the deepest roots in our
Constitution and system of jurisprudence. And it relates to a matter which
is usually the key item in the proof of guilt, and certainly one of overpowering
weight with the jury. The very introduction of an involuntary confession is a
denial of constitutional rights so prejudicial as to vitiate the conviction
irrespective of the quantum of other untainted evidence demonstrating the
guilt of the accused.43 (Emphasis added.)
The court in Pea recognized that there was a constitutional basis for accepting
a reasonable doubt standard, but chose not to apply it. The court, by adopting the
reasonable doubt standard as a rule of court, avoided the constitutional issue and
may never be called upon to decide it. "Whether [the reasonable doubt standard] is
also a constitutional requirement is now and may remain an academic question." 44
By applying the reasonable doubt standard to the preliminary hearing in the Massachusetts procedure jurisdiction, the United States Court of Appeals for the District
of Columbia Circuit is now providing more protection for the defendant than is
offered in the recognizably secure Orthodox procedure. The jury in the Orthodox
jurisdiction must accept the determination of the judge on the question of voluntariness, whereas under the Massachusetts rule a jury may reject the confession even after
the judge has concluded it voluntary beyond a reasonable doubt. The procedure now

41. State v. Yough, 49 N.J. 587, 599, 231 A.2d 598, 604 (1967).
42. "[I]n the exercise of our supervisory power over the administration of federal
criminal justice in the District of Columbia, [we] adopt the rule that a judicial determination that a confession is admissible cannot be made unless the judge is satisfied beyond
a reasonable doubt that the confession was voluntary." Pea v. United States, 397 F.2d
627, 637 (D.C. Cir. 1968). The Fourth Circuit had followed the same approach. Their
decision in United States v. Inman, supra note 28, "is explainable on the grounds of
our supervisory power over district courts within the Circuit .....
Morris v. Boles,
386 F.2d 395, 402 (4th Cir. 1967).
43. Clifton v. United States, supra note 6, at 362.
44. Pea v. United States, 397 F.2d 627, 637 n.4 (D.C. Cir. 1968).
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adopted as the rule for the courts of the District of Columbia overcomes the objections to the Massachusetts procedure. It is suggested, however, that those jurisdictions
45
which have yet to decide this issue should, wherever possible, adopt the Orthodox
procedure. This would provide the necessary safeguard for the defendant while
streamlining the judicial process and eliminating the need to debate the standard of
proof required in a Jackson v. Denno hearing.
45. Some states interpret their constitutions to require a jury determination of the
issue. See, e.g., People v. Huntley, 15 N.Y.2d 72, 204 N.E.2d 179, 255 N.Y.S.2d 838
(1965).

Indian Tribes-Comity Accorded by State Courts as Affected by
Federal Question-Absolute Executive Privilege-Davisv. Littell,
398 F.2d 83 (9th Cir. 1968).
A defamation action was brought by the appellant against the general counsel of
the Navajo Tribe in the District Court for the District of Arizona. Jurisdiction was
founded upon diversity of citizenship. Both parties were non-Indians who were
employed by the Navajo Tribe. Plaintiff, the assistant to the general counsel, alleged that he had been discharged from office and had suffered a loss of reputation as
a result of appellee's defamatory statements to the Tribal Council and others. The
defendant claimed absolute executive privilege under the Navajo Tribal Code1 and
the district court rendered summary judgment in his favor. The court found the
defendant's position to be within the scope of the absolute executive privilege
doctrine; that is, it found the Navajo Tribe to be a sovereign entity within the
United States and the position of general counsel to be comparable to the chief legal
officer of the United States, or any state or political subdivision.
Since Arizona had not spoken on this issue, however, the ruling of the district
court entailed a prediction of the extent to which Arizona state courts would accord
comity to an Indian tribe geographically located within the state's boundaries. In
affirming the district court's decision, the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit agreed
that an Indian tribe is a sovereign entity capable of bestowing absolute executive
privilege and stated that it was unable to say the district court erred in its prediction
2
that Arizona would accord comity to the law of the Navajo Tribe.
If for no other reason, this case is noteworthy in that it is one of first impression
in which comity has been accorded to an Indian tribe on the matter of absolute
executive privilege. Of interest also, however, are the implications of the court's

1. Although neither Tribal Code nor tribal court had specifically bestowed absolute
executive privilege to its executive officers, the tribe, under NAVAJO TRIBAL CODE tit. 7,
ch. 3, § 34(C), would be guided by federal and appropriate state law under such cir-

cumstances. Both federal and Arizona officers are granted this privilege and thus the
tribe can be said to have incorporated this privilege into its laws.
2. Davis v. Littell, 398 F.2d 83, 86 (9th Cir. 1968), petition for cert. filed, 37
U.S.L.W. 3159 (U.S. Oct. 14, 1968) (No 655).
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reasoning in reaching this result. In a diversity action, a federal court is bound to the
conflicts of law principles of the state in which it is sitting. In the instant case, the
district court was thus forced to predict whether Arizona, under its conflicts rules,
would accord comity to the absolute executive privilege granted by the Navajo Tribe.
If both parties to the suit were Arizona residents, an Arizona court would hear the
case and determine whether to accord comity to the privilege derived from the
Navajo Tribe. The implication is, of course, that the state need not accord comity.
A denial of comity on the matter of absolute executive privilege would result in
an infringement on the sovereignty of the tribe and might hinder tribal officers from
freely discharging their public duties. The comity issue in respect to Indian tribes is
more serious than the comity problems existing among states. The tribe is located
within the boundaries of a state and may be forced to hire non-Indians, as in the
present case, to obtain qualified executive officers. In its attempt to provide better
government by turning to the non-Indian community for its legal expertise, the
Navajo Tribe might conceivably endanger the sovereignty of its government by employing anyone subject to the jurisdiction of Arizona, since the state is apparently
not required to grant comity to privileges derived from the tribal government. The
status of Indian tribes as separate nations or entities with some degree of sovereignty
and their peculiar relationship to the government of the United States ("status of
dependent wards of the government ' 3 ) raise the question whether state interference
with the sovereignty of Indian tribes would be sanctioned. It might thus be asked
whether the affirmative defense of absolute executive privilege bestowed by a sovereign Indian tribe raises a federal question and places the case, once the defense is
raised, outside the jurisdiction of a state court. In answering this question, it is
necessary to determine the purpose of the absolute privilege doctrine and to examine
the special status accorded Indian tribes by the federal government.
Absolute Executive Privilege
The absolute executive privilege doctrine is intended to enable governmental officers
to discharge their public duties without the constant threat of retaliation in the form
5
of defamation suits. 4 Both federal and state governments have adopted the doctrine,
which applies to public officers only when acting in their official capacity. 6 The
primary purpose of the doctrine is the promotion of the public good by enabling
officers to discharge their public duties unflinchingly, 7 and not the protection of the
individual officer from law suits.8
3. Colliflower v. Garland, 342 F.2d 369, 375 (9th Cir. 1965).
4. Gregoire v. Biddle, 177 F.2d 579 (2d Cir. 1949), cert. denied, 339 U.S. 949
(1950).
5. See, e.g., Barr v. Matteo, 360 U.S. 564 (1959) (officers of executive departments);
Spalding v. Vilas, 161 U.S. 483 (1896) (Postmaster General); Long v. Mertz, 2 Ariz.
App. 215, 407 P.2d 404 (1965) (state highway department official).
6. See, e.g., Barr v. Matteo, supra note 5, at 569-70.
7. Gregoire v. Biddle, supra note 4, at 580.
8. Barr v. Matteo, supra note 5, at 571. See also Handler & Klein, The Defense of
Privilege in Defamation Suits Again Government Executive Officials, 74 HARV. L. REV.

44 (1960).
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In the instant case, the defendant was an officer in the Navajo Indian Tribe and
made the alleged defamatory statements in his official capacity as general counsel.
If in hearing this defamation action the state court is not required to direct a verdict
or grant summary judgment for the defendant when he invokes the affirmative defense
of absolute executive privilege, then the Navajo Tribe has been effectively deprived
of the benefit of the absolute executive privilege doctrine, a benefit flowing from
and reflecting the sovereign status of the tribe. The denial of comity to absolute executive privilege would thus undoubtedly have an adverse effect upon the functions of
the tribal government. In view of the special relationship of Indian tribes to the
federal government, it may be asked whether such a denial of comity would constitute
state interference in a federal matter.
Federal-State-TribalRelationship
The relationship of Indian tribes to the federal and state governments has been the
subject of judicial opinions and legislative concern since the founding of the Republic.
The framers of the Constitution specifically granted Congress power to regulate commerce with Indian tribes in Article I, clause 8. Chief Justice Marshall interpreted this
clause in Worcester v. Georgia9 and held that Indian tribes were domestic, dependent
sovereigns subordinate only to the federal government and outside the jurisdiction of
the states. The Worcester doctrine is still the basic doctrine of the Court.10 Recent
decisions have consistently held that Indian tribes retain their sovereignty except
where specifically taken away by congressional act or by treaty. 11
As might be expected, this situation of quasi-sovereign Indian tribes residing within
the boundaries of individual states has given rise to numerous jurisdictional disputes.
The Supreme Court has indicated that in jurisdictional questions affecting Indian
tribes, it is more concerned with the protection of Indian rights than with the identity
of the litigants. In Williams v. Lee, 12 for example, the Court reversed the Arizona
Supreme Court's holding that Arizona state courts had jurisdiction in a suit brought
by a non-Indian federally licensed trader, doing business on the Navajo reservation,
against an Indian debtor. In the opinion of the Court, Justice Black stated:
Essentially, absent governing Acts of Congress, the question has always been
whether the state action infringed on the right of reservation Indians to
make their own laws and be ruled by them.
There can be no doubt that to allow the exercise of state jurisdiction here
would undermine the authority of the tribal courts over Reservation affairs
and hence would infringe on the right of the Indians to govern themselves.
It is immaterial that respondent is not an Indian. He was on the Reservation

9. 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 214 (1832).
10. See, e.g., Williams v. Lee, 358 U.S. 217 (1959).
11. See, e.g., Maryland Cas. Co. v. Citizens Nat'l Bank, 361 F.2d 517, 520 (5th
Cir. 1966) ; Iron Crow v. Oglala Sioux Tribe, 231 F.2d 89 (8th Cir. 1956); Barnes v.
United States, 205 F. Supp. 97 (D. Mont. 1962).
12. Supra note 10.
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and the transaction with an Indian took place there. . . . The cases in this
Court have consistently guarded the authority of Indian governments over
their reservations. Congress recognized this authority in the Navajos in the
Treaty of 1868, and has done so ever since. If this power is to be taken
away from them, it is for Congress to do it.13 (Emphasis added.)
If in the instant case Arizona did not accord comity to the Navajos, it would
essentially deprive the Navajos of the right to adopt rules governing their executive
officers without congressional authorization. Recently, in Morgan v. Colorado River
Indian Tribe,14 the Court of Appeals *of Arizona interpreted the effect of Williams
on state court jurisdiction in matters involving an Indian tribe. Morgan involved a
wrongful death action arising from the alleged negligence of the Colorado Tribe in
maintaining a public resort. The suit, brought by a non-Indian, was dismissed on the
basis of the sovereign immunity of the tribe. In affirming the dismissal, the appellate
court noted:
While we agree with the appellant and the rationale of the Supreme Court
of Arizona [in Williams v. Lee] that an Indian tribe, in pursuit of commercial
enterprises in the state, should be amenable to suit in the state courts as a
result of torts committed in these activities, in absence of action by Congress
to the contrary, it would appear that the United States Supreme Court has
ruled to the contrary and any change must be by legislation or constitutional
amendment and not by court decision. 15
It can be inferred from these decisions that matters concerning the sovereignty of
Indian tribes involve a federal question and that state interference with the sovereignty
of a tribe can be permitted only by congressional authorization.
Comity-TribalAbsolute Executive Privilege
The preceding analysis of absolute executive privilege and its relation to sovereignty
and of the special status of Indian tribes suggests that this matter should be beyond
a state's discretion to accord comity. Any interference with the sovereign right of an
Indian tribe to make its own laws and to be governed by them is a matter of federal
concern. As noted above, the purpose of absolute executive privilege is to promote the
public good through the efficient administration of government. If the absolute executive privilege granted by the Navajo Tribe becomes the subject of comity, it appears
that the State of Arizona might be permitted to inflict injury or at least cause interference with the expeditious administration of the tribal government by rendering the
benefits of this privilege nugatory. Any interference in the internal affairs of the
tribal government involves a federal question; it is thus doubtful that a state court
can in its discretion be permitted to deny this privilege which is so intimately bound
with the autonomy of the tribe in its internal affairs.
Regarding the instant case, it might be suggested that a federal court need not have
predicted whether Arizona would accord comity to tribal law on the matter of
13. Id. at 220, 223.
14. 7 Ariz. App. 92, 436 P.2d 484 (1968).
15. Id. at ....... 436 P.2d at 487-88.
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absolute executive privilege. "The cases in [the Supreme] Court have consistently
guarded the authority of Indian governments over their reservations,"' 16 and it is this
federally protected right of autonomy over internal affairs to which the Davis court
should have looked when presented with the affirmative defense of absolute executive
privilege.
The federal nature of the question of absolute executive privilege granted by an
Indian tribe to a non-Indian officer might also be inferred from the fact that this
officer's contract with the tribe must be approved by the Secretary of the Interior and
the Commissioner of Indian Affairs. 17 The general counsel might thus have argued
that this federal approval vested in him a federally recognized legal right entitled
to judicial protection.
In any event, absolute executive privilege, which bears so directly on the internal
affairs of the tribal government, should not be subject to the control or interference
of states. This aspect of tribal sovereignty would appear to be a federally protected
privilege and thus beyond the discretion of the state courts. Absolute executive privilege
involves more than mere tribal law; it goes to the heart of tribal sovereignty, which is
beyond state jurisdiction without congressional consent. In the instant case, it might
thus be contended that the district court should not have attempted to predict whether
Arizona would accord comity to the tribal law, since the affirmative defense of absolute
executive privilege granted by the tribe raised a federal question and the district
court thereby acquired subject matter jurisdiction.
16. Williams v. Lee, supra note 10, at 223.
17. See 72 Stat. 927 (1958), 25 U.S.C. § 81 (1964).

Securities Fraud-Punitive Damages-Indemnity AgreementsGlobus v. Law Research Service, Inc., 287 F. Supp. 188 (S.D.N.Y.
1968).
Law Research Service operated an information retrieval program to serve the legal
profession by applying computer technology to the problems of legal research. The
company entered into an exclusive contract with the Sperry Rand Corporation which
obligated Sperry Rand to provide programming and other services for a period of
five years beginning June 5, 1963. On January 25, 1965, Sperry Rand terminated the
contract as of January 29, 1965, by reason of Law Research's nonpayment of more
than $82,000. Law Research sued Sperry Rand, and by sworn affidavit charged breach
of contract, fraud and deceit, and conspiracy; it also demanded specific performance.
Subsequently, Law Research publicly offered 100,000 shares of its common stock
under the Regulation A exemption from registration.l Blair & Co., Granberry, Marache,
1. 17 C.F.R. §§ 230.251-.263 (1968). Regulation A permits the issuance of stock
without a registration statement and the statutory prospectus. The primary criterion for
eligibility is that the issue be worth less than $300,000.
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Inc. (Blair), was the underwriter. An offering circular dated March 15, 1965, admittedly prepared by the defendants and bearing the name of Blair, was issued to
the public. The circular referred prominently to the Sperry Rand contract as an
obviously attractive feature of the issue. Plaintiffs alleged that the circular misrepresented relations between the two companies by omitting any mention of the
contract termination by Sperry Rand or of the suit by Law Research.
Thirteen purchasers of the stock brought an action against Law Research alleging
reliance upon the description of the contract with Sperry Rand. It was undisputed
that Ellias C. Hoppenfeld, president of Law Research, knew of Sperry Rand's termination letter, the subsequent lawsuit, and Sperry Rand's refusal to render service, and
that he had omitted these material facts from the notification and offering circular.
Plaintiffs proved at trial that Hoppenfeld revealed these facts to Blair. Claimants
sought compensatory damages against Hoppenfeld and Blair, alleging violation of
Section 17(a) 2 of the Securities Act of 1933 and Section 10(b) 3 of the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934, and for common law fraud; and against Blair alone for violation of Section 12(2)4 of the 1933 Act and 15(c) 5 of the 1934 Act. Plaintiffs also
sought punitive damages against Blair, Hoppenfeld, and Law Research for violation
of Section 17(a) of the 1933 Act. The jury found for the plaintiffs except as to
common law fraud and awarded punitive damages against Hoppenfeld and Blair,
refusing however to do so against Law Research. 6 On defendants' motion to dismiss
the award of punitive damages, the court held that punitive damages will be awarded
as an implied civil remedy under Section 17(a) of the 1933 Act for injury resulting
from omission of material facts from a notification and offering circular when it
might have been difficult, if not impossible, to have induced the public to invest in
7
the issue had the material facts not been suppressed.
Blair and Law Research asserted cross-claims against each other on an indemnity
agreement. The jury found in favor of Blair, but Judge Mansfield precluded recovery
by granting judgment n.o.v. and held that indemnity will be denied as being against
public policy if the underwriter has actual knowledge of misleading statements or
omissions in the offering circular. 8 The award for the first time under the 1933
Act of punitive damages as an implied remedy, and the nonenforcement of the
indemnity agreement between an underwriter and an issuer represent important
advances in securities law. Discussion will be limited to these aspects. 9
Section 17(a) of the Securities Act of 1933,10 makes unlawful various practices that
2. 48 Stat. 84, 15 U.S.C. § 77q(a) (1964).
3. 48 Stat. 891, 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1964).
4. 48 Stat. 84, 15 U.S.C. § 771(2) (1964).
5. 52 Stat. 1075, 15 U.S.C. § 78o(c) (1964).
6. The court explained this peculiar result by suggesting that the jury was "sensible"
not to assess punitive damages against Law Research since that company had little
money aside from that derived by capitalization. Other defrauded investors might find
Law Research without funds. The jury's general verdict, however, makes this speculative.
7. Globus v. Law Research Serv., Inc., 287 F. Supp. 188, 192-96 (S.D.N.Y. 1968).
8. Id. at 198-99.
9. Compensatory damage liability has long been established for the various causes
of action under other provisions of the 1933 and 1934 Acts, and will not be discussed.
10. 48 Stat. 84, 15 U.S.C. § 77q(a) (1964).
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defraud purchasers of securities by use of any means or instruments of transportation
or communication in interstate commerce, or by the use of the mails. This section does
not provide express civil liability for violations. Purchasers of securities, the class of
persons to be protected, have an implied civil remedy under common law principles. 11
In a few decisions, courts have awarded punitive damages under federal statutes
not expressly granting such a remedy. In Wills v. Trans World Airlines, Inc.,12 a
passenger, denied permission to board a flight for which he had secured confirmed
reservations, was awarded a judgment for $1.54 compensatory damages and $5,000
exemplary damages. The court stated that its purpose was "to complement the
criminal and injunctive provisions of the [Civil Aeronautics] Act, and to afford the
courts the means to make effective vindication of the rights of the individual airline
passenger which have been willfully or wantonly violated." 13 The court in Basista v.
Weir14 declared the existence of a federal common law of damages for federal causes
of action. Basista arose under Section 1983 of the Civil Rights Act of 1871,15 which is
silent as to the type of damages that may be awarded. The section does not in fact
mention "damages" but states that the offending person "shall . . . be liable to the
party injured in any action at law." The court held that "the federal common law of
damages commands the issue of damages. . . . We are also of the view that the
federal law permits the recovery of exemplary or punitive damages."' 16 The court said
that exemplary damages could be given whenever federally protected rights are invaded, under the theory that courts have the power to adjust remedies to grant
necessary relief for willful invasion of rights. Statutory policy as established in the
Jones Act (for actions by injured seamen) was deemed effectuated in the award of
17
punitive damages as an implied remedy. In In Re Den Norske Amerikalinje A/S,
the court granted such damages despite the lack of an express provision under the
Act, and despite lack of precedent under the Jones Act. The Court explained that
the purpose of the Jones Act was to secure rights of merchant seamen. Finding the

11. Osborne v. Mallory, 86 F. Supp. 869 (S.D.N.Y. 1949). See also Lynn v. Caraway,
252 F. Supp. 858 (W.D. La. 1966), aff'd, 379 F.2d 943 (5th Cir. 1967); Pfeffer v.
Cressaty, 223 F. Supp. 756 (S.D.N.Y.

1963); RESTATEMENT

(SECOND)

OF TORTS

§ 286 (1965). But see Trussell v. United Underwriters, Ltd., 228 F. Supp. 757 (D.
Colo. 1964), where the court found different remedies available for the various subsections of Section 17(a). The court's conclusion that congressional intent dictated both
for and against an implied civil remedy within the same section is anomalous.
12. 200 F. Supp. 360 (S.D. Cal. 1961).
13. Id. at 368. It should be noted that the $5,001.54 award well exceeds the $2,000
maximum established by the Act's general criminal provision for willful violations.
14. 340 F.2d 74 (3d Cir. 1965).
15. 17 Stat. 13, 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1964).
16. Basista v. Weir, supra note 14, at 87. Section 1983 of the Civil Rights Act has
been the vehicle for awarding punitive damages under an implied federal cause of action
in a growing number of cases. See Hague v. CIO, 101 F.2d 774 (3d Cir.), modified on
other grounds, 307 U.S. 496 (1939) ; Tracy v. Robbins, 40 F.R.D. 108 (D.S.C. 1966),
appeal dismissed, 373 F.2d 13 (4th Cir. 1967); Washington v. Official Court Stenographer, 251 F. Supp. 945 (E.D. Pa. 1966); Antelope v. George, 211 F. Supp. 657 (D.
Idaho 1962).
17. 276 F. Supp. 163 (N.D. Ohio 1967).
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behavior of the ship's captain so violative of the avowed purpose of the Act as to be
callous and wanton, the court assessed punitive damages. 18
In Globus, the court cited the existence of precedent for punitive damages in
diverse fields of federal regulation (citing Basista and Den Norske Amerikalinje
among others) to justify the award of exemplary damages. Having found precedent
by analogy, the court then found precedent in securities law in the case of Nagel v.
Prescott & Co. 19 That action was brought against sellers of stock who guaranteed an
imminent windfall and who were not completely candid in description of the stock.
In issue, primarily, were a number of procedural questions on the permissible extent
of interrogatories. The court did rule, however, that upon proper showing of malicious conduct, exemplary damages would be granted under Section 16 of the 1933
Securities Act.20 In the principal case, after discussing the analogous case-law, Judge
Mansfield said that an award of punitive damages to deter alleged fradulent conduct
would be in accord with the overall purpose of the anti-fraud provisions of the
Securities Act.
Defendants in Globus objected to the standard used for the award of punitive
damages-that of Walker v. Sheldon,21 which allowed punitive damages "where the
22
fraud, aimed at the public generally, is gross and involves high moral culpability."
Defendants argued that the jury verdict for them on the common law fraud count
precluded recovery of punitive damages under Section 17(a) of the 1933 Act, since
the elements of justifiable reliance and intent to defraud were not proved; that is to
say, plaintiffs should be required to prove that the alleged misconduct resulted in
justifiable reliance (not mere actual reliance), and that defendants had a specific
intent to defraud a particular individual, notwithstanding a general fraudulent purpose aimed at the public as a whole. The Globus court refused to limit the standard
so narrowly, citing Walker. The idea that the alleged fraud be the result of an intention by defendant to defraud a particular complainant was rejected; the fraud need
only be directed at the public generally under Section 17(a). Moreover, mere knowledge of the falsehood or omissions was held to establish liability under that section.
The court reasoned that it would be anomalous to force a civil plaintiff to prove intent
23
when the government need not prove it to convict criminally under the same section.
In choosing the standard on which punitive damages were assessed, however, the
court failed to state the reason for its choice; as a result, it has added confusion to the
already unclear issue of whether a state or federal standard should be used as a
measure of conduct and damages once it has been decided that punitive damages may

18. Id. at 180-89.
19. 36 F.R.D. 445 (N.D. Ohio 1964).
20. Id. at 449. The court in Nagel avers that, if susceptible of proof, allegations of
willful and malicious representations and of defendant's taking advantage of the plaintiff's ill health, would lay the foundation for an award of exemplary damages. But the
court looked to Ohio law for a standard of misconduct to determine the propriety of
the award. Id. at 449-50.
21. 10 N.Y.2d 401,179 N.E.2d 497, 223 N.Y.S.2d 488 (1961).
22. Id. at 405, 179 N.E.2d at 499, 223 N.Y.S.2d at 491.
23. Globus v. Law Research Serv., Inc., supra note 7, at 197-98.
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be given under a federal statute. 24 The court seemingly relied on the Walker 25 standard, citing the case several times and employing its language in the jury instructions
on punitive damages.26 Cases from other jurisdictions were cited to explain the
purpose of punitive damages; but only Walker and two diversity cases relying on it
were used to articulate the standard of such damages.
Arguably, then, the court, deciding a federal question, looked to the law of the
state where the cause of action accrued in instructing the jury; that is, it seems to
have behaved as it would have in a diversity suit, under the Erie27 doctrine. This
semblance is misleading. Since the court was implying punitive damages under a
federal statute, there was no need to rely on New York law, but there was a need to
28
apply a federal standard which would promote national uniformity in future cases.
Hopefully, the court looked to Walker only because there was no federal standard,
and because Walker expressed well the formulation that Judge Mansfield wished to
follow in shaping a federal standard. By failing to explain its reason for choosing the
Walker standard, the court injected confusion into an otherwise admirable decision.
The refusal to enforce the Blair-Law Research indemnification agreement is the
second notable aspect of the Globus decision. The agreement obligated Law Research
to indemnify Blair for losses due to any untrue statement of material fact in the
offering circular. Blair was not to be indemnified for willful misfeasance, bad faith,
or gross negligence in the performance of its duties, nor by reason of its reckless disregard of obligations and duties pursuant to the underwriting of the issue. Blair's
contention that it should be indemnified rested upon its role as a "passive" tortfeasor
as opposed to the "active" tortious conduct of Hoppenfeld and Law Research. The
jury was apparently persuaded by Blair's lesser-of-two-evils argument, but the court
found public policy to preclude the enforcement of any indemnification agreement.

24. The court in Nagel v. Prescott, supra note 19, would have allowed punitive damages in light of local law. But Basista v. Weir, supra note 14, rendered a decision under
the federal common law of damages. The prospect of applying federal law only to
actual or compensatory damages, while simultaneously applying the different state laws
to the issue of exemplary or punitive damages, was characterized as "a legal hybrid of
an incredible and unworkable kind." Id. at 87.
25. It is stated that the court seemingly relied on the Walker standard, because the
court's instructions on common law fraud and on punitive damages were given to the
jury at the same time. It appears that the federal court did, in fact, apply New York
law to the question of the requisites to an award of punitive damages.
26. Globus v. Law Research Serv., Inc., supra note 7, at 200.
27. Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
28. The confusion that could result from the standard used is best seen by examining
the variations among the several states. In at least four states, Louisiana, Massachusetts,
Nebraska, and Washington, in the absence of express statutory authorization, no punitive damages will be granted; no quantum of misconduct justifies such an award. States
that allow punitive damages often will not allow an award as an independent basis of
recovery; that is, without a showing of actual damages, no exemplary damages are
allowed; cf. Annot., 17 A.L.R.2d 529 (1951). In some jurisdictions, the punitive damages
allowed must be proportionate to the actual damages. In some, no damages need be
proved. Certain jurisdictions impose exemplary damages upon a showing of malice in
fact. In others, malice in law sufficies; cf. Annot., 31 A.L.R.2d 713, 728-35 (1953).
The legal morass that would ensue from similar variations within the federal structure
would, indeed, be "a legal hybrid of an incredible kind."
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Sections 1129 and 12(2)30 of the Securities Act of 1933 demand that an underwriter
make a diligent investigation of an issuer's circular to prevent untruthful statements
or omissions. The court stated:
The purpose of the federal securities acts is to insure that the public investor, including particularly small investors such as the plaintiffs here, will
obtain the benefit of a thorough investigation of the facts set forth in a
prospectus or offering circular, not only by the issuer but also by the under31
writer, so that prospective investors will have access to the truth.
In general, indemnity agreements can only tend to allay the underwriter's fear of
liability pursuant to Section 11. Professor Louis Loss asserts that "[i]ndemnification...
is hostile to the in terrorern effect intended for § 11; negligence in the preparation of
the registration statement was made a basis of civil liability largely in order to promote
careful adherence to the statutory requirements." 32 The in terrorern effect of Section
11 would have lost all vitality had the indemnity agreement been enforced in the
instant case. Blair had actual knowledge of the omissions and misleading statements;
where the law demands an investigation, surely there is a concomitant obligation to
disclose its results. This unprecedented case wisely holds that when an underwriter
has actual knowledge or notice of fraudulent schemes, indemnification agreements
will not be enforced to recover losses resulting from statutory liability. Since Law
Research stock was issued pursuant to a Regulation A exemption from registration,
the Securities Exchange Commission had small opportunity to investigate the accuracy of the offering circular. The burden on the underwriter in the process of
multiple investigation is therefore greater. The court properly denied enforcement of
a pre-arranged cushion against liability.
The Globus decision is a commendable advance in federal securities law. Investors
will have an adequate remedy where damages are limited and/or where the stock
issue is small. Underwriters who know of frauds will not be able to shift the risk of
liability on their obligations with impunity.
29.
30.
31.
32.

48 Stat. 82, 15 U.S.C. § 77k(1964).
48 Stat. 84, 15 U.S.C. § 771(2) (1964).
Globus v. Law Research Serv., Inc., supra note 7, at 199.
L. Loss, SECURITIES REGULATION 1831 (1961). See also Comment, Indemnification of Underwriters and Section 11 of the Securities Act of 1933, 72 YALE L.J. 406
(1962), agreeing that the Act contemplates that registration statements will be separately verified by several parties to the issuance. Id. at 410.
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Torts-Damages-Emotional Trauma from Witnessing InjuryDillon v. Legg ......
- Cal. 2d ...... , 441 P.2d 912, 69 Cal. Rptr. 72
(1968).
Five-year-old Erin Lee Dillon had started across the road ahead of her mother and
sister when Legg's car hit her. Mrs. Dillon and the sister, Cheryl, witnessed the accident from the side of the road. Erin subsequently died. Her mother and her sister
brought an action to recover damages for physical and mental pain and suffering
resulting from the emotional disturbance and nervous shock sustained in witnessing
Legg's negligent act.1 The defendant moved for judgment on the pleadings, contending that neither the mother nor the sister had stated a cause of action. The
defendant argued that under California case law,2 no cause of action is stated in the
apprehension of or the witnessing of negligently caused injury to a third person,
"unless the complaint alleges that the plaintiff suffered emotional distress, fright or
3
shock as a result of fear for his own safety."
The trial court granted the defendant summary judgment on the mother's cause
of action but denied it in the sister's cause, since the sister might have been close
enough to the accident to be in the zone of danger, while Mrs. Dillon was not. Mrs.
Dillon appealed. Held, reversed; a mother's assertion of emotional trauma and
resulting physical injury caused by witnessing from close proximity the death of her
child by the negligent act of a defendant motorist alleges a prima facie case against
4
the motorist.
In a 4-3 decision, the California Supreme Court thus expanded the realm of liability
for tortfeasors in California by broadening the concept of legal duty to include protection of empathetic bystanders who, like Mrs. Dillon, suffer shock resulting in
physical injury. The two hallowed arguments of the possibility of fraudulent claims
and the difficulty in setting precise definitions for future cases were rejected as
contrived and outdated. In so holding, the court expressly overruled the law in
California on this point as set out in Amaya v. Home Ice, Fuel & Supply Co. 5 only
five years earlier.
At common law, courts were reluctant to allow recovery for injury resulting only
from mental disturbance or nervous shock caused by a negligent act.6 It was thought
1. Plaintiffs alleged three causes of action: wrongful death, physical injury due to
Mrs. Dillon's mental pain and suffering after witnessing the accident, and physical
injury due to Cheryl's emotional disturbance in witnessing the accident. There was no
question as to the first allegation stating a cause of action. The sufficiency of the second
and third allegations was contested by the defendant.
2. Amaya v. Home Ice, Fuel & Supply Co., 59 Cal. 2d 295, 379 P.2d 513, 29 Cal.
Rptr. 33 (1963).
3. Dillon v. Legg, ...... Cal. 2d .......
, 441 P.2d 912, 915, 69 Cal. Rptr. 72, 75
(1968), citing Reed v. Moore, 156 Cal. App. 2d 43, 319 P.2d 80 (1957).
4. Id. at ....... 441 P.2d at 925, 69 Cal. Rptr. at 85.
5. Supra note 2.
6. See generally Annot., 18 A.L.R.2d 220 (1951) ; W. PROSSER, LAW OF TORTS § 11
(1955 ed.). The leading American cases denying recovery under such circumstances are
Spade v. Lynn & Boston Ry., 168 Mass. 285, 47 N.E. 88 (1897), and Mitchell v.
Rochester R.R., 151 N.Y. 107, 45 N.E. 354 (1896).
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that such disturbances were so nebulous and speculative that they eluded precise
legal definition and thus were not suspectible of recovery. 7 The only exception occurred when the mental disturbance was accompanied by a definable cause of action
such as an assault, battery or false imprisonment, in which the mental problem was
ancillary or "parasitic" and therefore an element of damages. 8 In these circumstances
there was at least a touching of the plaintiff; hence the term "impact" is used to
indicate that requirement. But this was a severe test; the plaintiff's narrow escape and
subsequent trauma was not actionable in the states that adhered to it. 9 Other states,
including California, have allowed recovery without actual impact but only if the
0
plaintiff was in the immediate area of the negligent act or "the zone of danger."'
Regardless of the impact requirement or the more liberal zone of danger test, the
great majority of the states have refused recovery to plaintiffs who claim damages for
physical injury from emotional trauma after witnessing a negligent act toward a
third party.11 The cases in which recovery was allowed were those in which the
12
court found the tort intentional and therefore the emotional damage foreseeable.
The pleading of liberal tort liability statutes has not led to an opposite result because
13
the duty of due care must first be established.
The Cardozo dictum in Palsgraf v. Long Island R.R. Co.14 that a negligent defendant is liable only for the natural and probable consequences of his wrong formed
the basis for the general line of reasoning applied to this kind of case: the unforeseeable plaintiff cannot recover unless the negligent act constituted a wrong personal
to him by his being in the zone of danger. The Palsgraf reasoning is illustrated in

7. See, e.g., Huston v. Freemansburg, 212 Pa. 548, 61 A. 1022 (1905); Lynch v.
Knight, 11 Eng. Rep. 854 (H.L. 1861).
8. See W. PROSSER, supra note 6.
9. Many states still adhere to this rule. See Annot., 64 A.L.R.2d 100, 134-37 (1959),
for a comprehensive list of "impact" states.
10. See Annot., 64 A.L.R.2d 100, 143-51 (1959) ; Cook v. Maier, 33 Cal. App. 581,
92 P.2d 434 (1939).
11. Recent cases so holding include: Hopper v. United States, 244 F. Supp. 314
(D. Colo. 1965); Mahaffey v. Official Detective Stories, Inc., 210 F. Supp. 251 (W.D.
La. 1962); Beaty v. Buckeye Fabric Finishing Co., 179 F. Supp. 688 (E.D. Ark. 1959) ;
Amaya v.Home Ice, Fuel & Supply Co., supra note 2; McCullough v.Orcutt, 14 Ill.
App. 2d 503, 145 N.E.2d 109 (1957); Honeycutt v. American Gen. Ins. Co., 126 So. 2d
789 (La. App. 1961) ; Barber v. Pollock, 104 N.H. 379, 187 A.2d 788 (1963) ; Lahann
v.Cravotta, 228 N.Y.S.2d 371 (Sup. Ct. 1962); Bedard v. Notre Dame Hosp., 89 R.I.
195, 151 A.2d 690 (1959).
12. State Rubbish Collectors Ass'n v. Siliznoff, 38 Cal. 2d 330, 240 P.2d 282 (1952);
Cohn v. Ansonia Realty Co., 162 App. Div. 791, 148 N.Y.S. 39 (1914); Hill v. Kimball,
76 Tex. 210, 13 S.W. 59 (1890); Wilkinson v.Downton, 2 Q.B. 57 (1897).
13. See CAL. CIVIL CODE § 3333 (West 1954): "For the breach of an obligation not
arising from contract, the measure of damages, except where otherwise expressly provided by this Code, is the amount which will compensate for all the detriment proximately caused thereby, whether it could have been anticipated or not." (Emphasis added.)
In Amaya, the court did not apply this statute because it presupposed a sufficient cause
of action. But see Commercial Union Ins. Co. v. Gonzalez Rivera, .358 F.2d 480 (1st
Cir. 1966), construing a Puerto Rico statute reading, "[a] person who . . .causes damage
to another through fault or negligence shall be obliged to repair the damage so done."
31 L.P.R.A. § 5141 (1955). The court allowed recovery to a third party plaintiff.
14. 248 N.Y. 339. 162 N.E. 99 (1928).
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Waube v. Warrington,15 a case which has been the foundation for emotional trauma
decisions for 30 years and whose facts closely parallel those in the instant case. In
Waube, a mother witnessed her infant daughter's death under the wheels of a truck.
The mother's emotional reaction resulted in her death. The court denied any recovery on these facts because her injury was not foreseeable in the sense that the defendant owed her no duty of due care. She was "outside the range of ordinary physical
peril." The mother's admitted lack of fear for her own safety was fatal to any
cause of action.
The California courts' reaction to the issue of whether a plaintiff-witness can recover from shock has ranged from outright rejection because the claim had no
common law or statutory basis, 16 to the reasoning that the claim would be entertained if the plaintiff was close enough to the act to have feared for his own safety
even though the cause of action, as pleaded, claimed emotional trauma only from
witnessing the act. 17 Emotional trauma damages resulting from witnessing a tort to
a third party would only be considered when an independent cause of action had
been made out. 18
To the lower courts, Amaya v. Home Ice, Fuel & Supply Co.19 was the obvious
precedent for the instant case. There, a mother brought suit for injuries resulting
from mental disturbance and shock after her 17-month-old son was run down by a
truck in her presence. The issue in that case, as here, was whether "tort liability [can]
be predicated on fright or nervous shock (with consequent bodily illness) induced
solely by the plaintiff's apprehension of negligently caused danger or injury to a third
person." 20 The answer was that no liability accrued because the mother had not
claimed any fear for her own safety.
The instant case, overruling Amaya, decides a similar problem on different terms.
Instead of resting the decision on the pyramid of precedent, the court analyzed the
bedrock of tort liability in negligence actions: the duty of due care. The essential
question was "'whether the plaintiff's interests are entitled to legal protection against
the defendant's conduct.' "21 The answer to that question is ultimately a reflection of
public policy.
Finding the basis of negligence liability in breach of duty, the majority attacks the
policy that originated that standard and the traditional reasons for denying recovery
in these circumstances: that the courts may be flooded with fraudulent claims if re-

15. 216 Wis. 603, 258 N.W. 497 (1935).
16. Clough v. Steen, 3 Cal. App. 2d 392, 39 P.2d 889 (1934). See Easton v. United
Trade School Contracting Co., 173 Cal. 199, 159 P. 597 (1916).
17. Lindley v. Knowlton, 179 Cal. 298, 176 P. 440 (1918). In this case a mother
fought off a berserk chimpanzee that was throttling one of her children in the living
room of her home. Accord, Webb v. Francis J. Lewald Coal Co., 214 Cal. 182, 4 P.2d
532 (1931).
18. Reed v. Moore, 156 Cal. App. 2d 43, 319 P.2d 80 (1957).
19. Supra note 2.
20. Amaya v. Home Ice, Fuel & Supply Co., supra note 2, at 297, 379 P.2d at 515,
29 Cal. Rptr. at 35.
21. Dillon v. Legg, supra note 3, at ......
, 441 P.2d 916, 69 Cal. Rptr. at 76, quoting
W. PROSSER, LAW OF

TORTS

332-33 (3d ed. 1964).
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covery is possible and that definable legal bounds for future cases are impossible
to fix. Both reasons are found defective.

22

The argument of limiting liability because of the possibility of fraud does not
justify the wholesale rejection of an entire class of claims. Impracticability of administration is no excuse for denying recovery to those who have suffered serious shock and
injury through negligence. The danger of fraud is present in every case, but our
system should be circumspect enough to distinguish the false from the valid. With regard to the problem of precise definition to limit the possible infinite liability following a negligent act, the court recognized the primary importance of foreseeability of
risk as an element of duty. The tortfeasor may be liable if the risk of actual impact was
foreseeable or if the risk of bodily injury resulting from emotional disturbance was
foreseeable. The circumstances in the instant case fall within the second kind of foreseeability. The court quoted Dean Prosser with approval: " 'If a duty to [the mother]
requires that she herself be in some recognizable danger, then it has properly been
said that when a child is endangered, it is not beyond contemplation that its mother
will be somewhere in the vicinity, and will suffer serious shock.' "23
With regard to future cases, the court said that in determining whether the reasonable foreseeability or the duty of care requirement is present, such factors as the
following should be considered:
(1) Whether plaintiff was located near the scene of the accident as contrasted
with one who was a distance away from it. (2) Whether the shock resulted
from a direct emotional impact upon plaintiff from the sensory and contemporaneous observance of the accident, as contrasted with learning of the
accident from others after its occurrence. (3) Whether plaintiff and the
victim were closely related, as contrasted with
an absence of any relationship
24
or the presence of only a distant relationship.
Although the court based its holding on the foreseeability of a mother's suffering severe
emotional trauma when she witnessed an accident to her child, foreseeability should
only be considered one aspect of the broader concept of duty upon which liability for
negligence is based. The court's imposition of the duty of due care toward related bystanders in these circumstances was essentially an exercise in negating the traditional
reasons for not allowing recovery, rather than a positive assertion of a principle to
replace the former law. Without more than reliance on the thread of foreseeability,
the lower courts in California will be forced to define the boundaries of such liability
for themselves when such definition should perhaps be drawn from public policy as
interpreted by the California legislature.
The Dillon decision may well be the harbinger of legislative action in California. It
certainly will be a matter of concern to the automobile insurance industry. But more
importantly, it has a glimmer of realization that the law has been hidebound in areas
of emotional effects causing physical injury to a witness who is closely related to the

22. Id. at ....... 441 P.2d at 917-20, 69 Cal. Rptr. at 77-79.
23. Id. at ...... , 441 P.2d at 914, 69 Cal. Rptr. at 74, quoting W. PRoSSER, LAW OF
TORTs 353 (3d ed. 1964).
24. Id. at ....... 441 P.2d at 920, 69 Cal. Rptr. at 80.
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injured person. That other courts will use the Dillon decision as a basis for allowing
such causes of action is questionable, but at the very least, courts will have to either
distinguish it or to reason around it. It cannot be ignored. In either event the law
25
in this area has been advanced.
25. Recently a New York court held that a claim for mental upset by a plaintiff
who had seen her son struck by a truck stated a cause of action. Tobin v. Grossman,
55 Misc. 2d 304, 284 N.Y.S.2d 997 (Sup. Ct. 1967).

